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Abstract
Essays on Dynamic Games
Io Kuan Vong
2021
This dissertation examines several economic questions related to dynamic incentives.
In the first chapter, I study a dynamic game in which an expert advises a sequence of
principals on their actions to match a hidden, randomly evolving state. The expert
privately knows her competence. The principals learn about the state and the expert’s
competence from past advice and past action outcomes, both publicly observable. I
find that the equilibrium can feature a “crisis of expertise,” in which principals dismiss
a competent expert’s correct advice, and rely only on public information. Notably,
the crisis happens precisely when the quality of public information is low, and thus
when the competent expert’s knowledge is much needed. Finally, I discuss policy
implications for alleviating the crisis.
In the second chapter, I study the design of certification schemes for a firm who
faces a sequence of consumers confronted with adverse selection and dynamic moral
hazard problems. I show that a certifier extracts the full net market surplus and
maximizes social welfare by using a low-standard, honors certification scheme: at
each time, a firm who signed up for certification is either “certified” or “certified with
honors;” moreover, an inept firm is always certified. I relate my findings to com-
mon concerns about the ability of such certification schemes to alleviate information
asymmetries, despite the prevalence of these schemes in practice.
In the third chapter, I consider the strategic manipulation problem in multistage
tournaments. In each stage, players are sorted into groups in which they play pairwise
matches against each other. The match results induce a ranking over players in each
group, and higher ranked players qualify to the next stage. Players prefer qualifying
to higher stages. In this setting, a player may potentially profit by exerting zero
effort in some matches even when effort exertion is costless. Since such behavior
manipulates the tournament, it is desired that full effort exertion is an equilibrium
and any equilibrium ranking of qualifying players is immune to manipulation. To
this end, I show that it is both necessary and sufficient to allow only the top-ranked
player to qualify from each group. Otherwise, rankings can become a noisy indicator
of players’ strengths, while effort cost and heterogeneous prize spread can be of little
relevance to players’ effort choices.
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Chapter 1
The Crisis of Expertise
1.1 Introduction
Experts give advice to guide decisions. Popular discussions suggest that technol-
ogy can lead to a “crisis of expertise” by making information abundant and publicly
accessible to decision makers (see, e.g., Nichols, 2017; Gurri, 2018; Eyal, 2019). A
common description of this crisis is that decision makers dismiss the genuine advice
that informed experts offer, and act solely on the basis of public information, for
instance, from social media. Indeed, Nichols (2017, p. 105) writes: “Ask any pro-
fessional or expert about the death of expertise, and most of them will immediately
blame the same culprit: the Internet.” Similarly, in a 2019 interview with CNBC,
a financial planner explains that this is the reason why people often stay away from
getting professional financial advice: “There is a lot more information online these
days, [...] so people feel like they can do it themselves.”1
How does the crisis of expertise affect the value of informed experts who offer
genuine advice? Is the crisis due to the abundance of public information? And if
so, is it simply a phenomenon where decision makers substitute high-quality public
1. “99% of Americans don’t use a financial advisor—here’s why,” CNBC, November 11, 2019.
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information for expert advice?
This paper addresses these questions in a simple model of expert advice. Decision
makers take actions after assessing two relevant pieces of information—current expert
advice and public information, the latter consisting of past advice and past action
outcomes. My analysis proposes that the access to public information allows “fake”
experts to benefit by pretending to give informed advice, despite them knowing no
more than the decision makers. The presence of these fake experts causes skeptical de-
cision makers to sometimes dismiss expert advice and act solely on the basis of public
information. A striking prediction of my model is that decision makers dismiss expert
advice only when the quality of public information is low, and thus when informed
experts’ knowledge is much needed. Hence, the crisis of expertise is a consequence of
the lack, as opposed to the abundance, of high-quality public information.
I describe my model in Section 1.2. An expert faces a sequence of principals who
arrive at random times. Each principal takes an action and wants his action to match
a binary state. The principal faces uncertainty, as the state is hidden and evolves
according to a Markov process. Before taking an action, the principal hires the expert
by paying her upfront for advice, with the payment reflecting his perceived value of
the advice. Once hired, the expert receives a private signal about the current state.
The expert is privately informed about her signal quality: she is either an “informed”
type who observes the state perfectly, or an “uninformed” type whose signal of the
state is uninformative. The expert’s advice and the state are publicly revealed after
the principal takes an action. The goal of the expert is to maximize the payments
she receives from the principals.
A central feature of the model is that the principals have noisy, evolving beliefs
about both the state and the expert’s type given the public information, namely, the
history of past pieces of advice and what the state turned out to be at past times.
The model is applicable to a variety of advising and consulting situations. To give
2
a concrete example, suppose that the expert is a financial analyst and the principals
are firms which choose to raise capital to fund either a risky project or a safe project.
A project succeeds only if enough investors invest in it. The state of the market
varies over time and can be “fear” or “greed;” if the market is fearful (resp., greedy),
then only the safe (resp., risky) project receives enough funds. The firms are unsure
about the state and therefore hire the analyst. They evaluate the advice, and then
determine their optimal decisions, based on the past capital-raising outcomes by other
firms as well as the past advice given by the financial analyst.
As the preceding discussion motivates, the goal of my analysis is to elucidate how
the principals value genuine, informed advice given the public information. In Section
1.3, I thus characterize equilibria where the informed expert truthfully reports her
private information relevant to the principal’s decision-making, namely her type and
current private signal, in each principal’s arrival.
In any equilibrium, it is impossible for an informed type’s report to convey in-
formation about her type to each principal, due to the uninformed type’s incentive
to appear informed. Hence, the expert’s report in each arrival is effectively a report
of the current state. The informed type reports her state observation truthfully. In-
stead, the uninformed type mixes between reporting either state in order to “gamble”
for her reputation, namely the principals’ belief that she is an informed type. To see
how this mixture is determined, call the state that is most likely given the public
information the agreeing state, and the other state is the disagreeing state. From
the uninformed type’s perspective, disagreeing is likely to be incorrect, and hence,
to reveal her type. Yet, if it is correct, her reputation will jump up and given the
equilibrium strategies, so will the principals’ future payments. The uninformed type
may thus want to gamble on the unlikely event that disagreeing is correct.
From each principal’s perspective, if he knew that the expert is informed, then he
would match his action with the experts report. In contrast, if the principal knew that
3
the expert is uninformed, then he would follow the public state belief and match his
action with the agreeing state, irrespective of the report. Because of the uninformed
expert’s gambling incentives, I show that there is a region of public beliefs about the
state and the expert’s type which corresponds to a crisis of expertise. Principals who
arrive with beliefs in this region dismiss the expert’s advice, that is, they match their
actions with the agreeing state independently of the expert’s report. Importantly,
the crisis region excludes high enough, inconclusive state beliefs. This is because a
principal who arrives with a high state belief, namely high-quality public information
about the state, knows that the uninformed type shares the same state belief and has
little incentive to gamble, as disagreeing is very likely to be incorrect.
In Section 1.4, I turn to the implications of my analysis, addressing the motivating
questions in the opening paragraphs. First, I show that although the uninformed
type’s gambling undermines the value of expert advice, the damage it causes on
the informed expert’s payoff dissipates in the long run. In particular, the crisis of
expertise is a short-run phenomenon, as the public information allows the informed
expert to build her reputation. When the reputation grows sufficiently high, each
arriving principal expects that the uninformed type is less likely to gamble, and thus
matches his action with the expert’s report. I relate my findings to concerns in the
market for retail financial advice that the presence of fake experts undermine the
value of informed advisors and their genuine advice.
Second, I discuss how my analysis speaks to the two faces of public information
technologies, like social media, for decision-making. On the one hand, my findings
predict that these technologies give decision makers access to resources that inform
their decision-making and help them identify the expert’s informativeness. On the
other hand, my results show that these technologies also provide the uninformed ex-
pert with the same resources and endogenously lead to a convention that rewards
successful contrarians. Such conventions are pervasive in practice and provide incen-
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tives for uninformed experts to gamble at the expense of decision makers. I relate
these observations to recent empirical evidence on gambling by financial analysts.
Finally, I point to policies for alleviating the crisis of expertise, and relate my
findings to recent advocates by political campaigns and consumer groups to equip
consumers with high-quality public information. I argue that such policies are most
needed in economic environments where state transitions occur neither very often
nor very rarely. Specifically, my analysis predicts that such environments provide the
uninformed type with the strongest incentives to gamble for her reputation.
My model belongs to the literature on expert reputation, and particularly relates
to reputational cheap talk models. These are models where a careerist expert either
herds with the public state belief (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Prendergast, 1993;
Zwiebel, 1995; Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2006a,b,c), or anti-herds with the public state
belief (e.g., Trueman, 1994; Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Levy, 2004).2 The idea that
experts might gamble for their reputations is familiar from these anti-herding models,
albeit in different contexts and under different assumptions.
To characterize the crisis of expertise and its dynamics, my model has three central
and distinguishing features relative to the existing reputational cheap talk models.
First, the state evolves randomly over time.3 Second, my model features receivers,
i.e., the principals, who take actions upon receiving advice. These two features allow
me to characterize why a principal may act solely on the basis of public information
and independently of expert advice.
2. The idea that experts strive to appear informed has motivated a large literature. See also
Brandenburger and Polak (1996), Effinger and Polborn (2001), Prat (2005), Li (2007), Klein and
Mylovanov (2017), Pavesi and Scotti (2019), Rüdiger and Vigier (2019), Smirnov and Starkov (2019)
and Backus and Little (2020).
3. Indeed, my analysis takes a step towards the direction of developing a dynamic model of
reputational cheap talk. When discussing directions for future research in a survey of the literature,
Marinovic, Ottaviani, and Sørensen (2013) write that “a key challenge lies in finding a tractable
and sufficiently general multi-period environment with learning about the precision [of the expert’s
information] as well as about the state.”
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Third, the expert’s payoff in my model depends on the principals’ perceived value
of her advice, instead of being a reduced-form “reputational payoff,” as is often as-
sumed in the literature, that depends solely on the expert’s reputation. This departure
means that the expert’s reputation concern is instrumental in my model: even if the
principals believe that the expert is likely to be informed, they pay her a positive
amount only if they expect the advice to convey useful information. As a result, the
two expert types continuation payoffs typically differ from each other given any equi-
librium history as they differ in the ability to give correct advice. Together, the three
departures allow my analysis to examine the effect of uninformed experts’ gambling
on the value of informed experts and their genuine advice, to shed light on the forma-
tion of contrarian-rewarding conventions as an equilibrium outcome, to highlight how
uninformed experts’ gambling incentives depend on the uncertainty of the economic
environment, as well as to capture the “fly-by-night” nature that uninformed experts
reveal their identity in the short run. These phenomena are novel to the literature
and are prominent in practice.
The basic incentive structure of my model is reminiscent of the bad reputation
model a là Ely and Välimäki (2003). Nonetheless, my model does not feature bad
reputation. In both models, the efficient outcome is attainable in a one-shot inter-
action as well as in repeated interactions with complete information on the expert’s
type. Moreover, in both models, the efficient outcome is unattainable in repeated
interactions when there is incomplete information on the expert’s type. In Ely and
Välimäki (2003), the principals cannot perfectly verify the expert’s signal at the end
of each interaction. In turn, a “good” expert’s desire to separate herself from a “bad”
expert creates perverse incentives for the good expert to act against principals’ inter-
ests. In contrast, in my model, such perverse incentives are absent, as the principals
can perfectly verify whether the expert’s report was correct following each action.
The broader literature on expert reputation examines models with different in-
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centive structures. One strand of the literature consists of models where experts
take costly actions to appear competent, starting with the seminal work by Holm-
ström (1999).4 My analysis is related to Prendergast and Stole (1996) in that a
careerist agent’s reaction to new information changes over time. In their model, this
phenomenon is due to the agent’s incentive to avoid revealing that she has made
mistakes in the past. The agent’s behavior remains inefficient in the long run. In my
model, the expert’s behavior changes over time for different reasons. The informed
type’s behavior changes in response to her evolving state belief. On the other hand,
the uninformed type’s behavior changes in response to both her evolving state belief
and her evolving reputation. In particular, her behavior entails less efficiency losses
as time progresses. Another strand examines experts who communicate to bias the
principals’ decisions, and strive to appear unbiased (e.g., Sobel, 1985; Benabou and
Laroque, 1992; Morris, 2001; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006).
There is also a literature on testing experts, starting with Foster and Vohra (1998),
that aims to determining the existence of a test which cannot be passed by an expert
without knowledge of the true data-generating process but can be passed almost
surely by an expert who knows the process.5 Recently, Deb and Stewart (2018), Deb,
Pai, and Said (2018) and Deb, Mitchell, and Pai (2020) examine dynamic mechanisms
that screen experts’ ability. Different from these models, the expert in my model faces
implicit incentives to appear informed, as her ability is evaluated by a “market,”
namely a sequence of short-lived principals, without commitment power.
4. See also Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a,b), Majumdar and Mukand (2004), Bonatti
and Hörner (2017), Cisternas (2018), and Halac and Kremer (2020).
5. For a survey, see Olszewski (2015).
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1.2 Model
Setup. Time t ∈ [0,∞) is continuous, and the horizon is infinite. A long-lived
expert faces a countable sequence of short-lived principals. The expert has a private
type θ ∈ Θ := {θI , θU}. She is an informed type θI with probability p0 ∈ (0, 1),
and is an uninformed type θU otherwise. The principals arrive according to a Poisson
process (Nt)t≥0 with intensity normalized to one. A hidden state (st)t≥0, taking values
on S := {
¯
s, s̄} with initial value s0 = s̄, evolves according to a Markov process with
switching rate (or volatility) γ ∈ (0,∞) at each state.6 The expert’s type, the state
process and the arrival process are independent.
Actions and flow payoffs. When a principal arrives at time t, he pays the ex-
pert a wage wt ∈ R+ upfront.7 The wage equals the principal’s marginal gain from
interacting with the expert, as I specify below in (1.1). The expert sends a message
mt ∈M to the principal, where M is a finite set. The principal then takes an action
at ∈ S, obtaining a benefit bt = 1 if at = st and bt = −1 otherwise. The principal’s
flow payoff equals his benefit minus the wage, bt−wt. The expert’s flow payoff equals
the wage wt.
The flow payoffs are discounted at rate r > 0. Given an infinite history of arrival
times (ti)
∞
i=1 and wages (wti)
∞
i=1 at those times, the expert’s (normalized) payoff is
∞∑
i=1
r e−rti wti .
6. The analysis readily extends to allowing for general initial state distributions, as well as asym-
metric switching rates at the cost of extra notation. Section 1.5 discusses the extension to more
states.
7. Although output-contingent contracts are theoretically attractive, my model assumes that wages
are paid upfront, as is often the case in my motivating applications such as financial advice and
business consulting (see, e.g., McLachlin, 2000; Momparler, Carmona, and Lassala, 2015).
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Information. At each principal’s arrival time t, before sending a message, the
expert receives a private signal yt ∈ S. If the expert is an informed type, then the
signal is equal to the current state. If the expert is an uninformed type, then the
signal is equal to either s̄ or
¯
s with equal probabilities, and is therefore pure noise.
In addition, in each arrival, the principal’s action and his realized benefit are public;
the current state is thus publicly revealed once the benefit is realized.
Histories. A public history of length n is a list
hn = (ti,mti , ati , bti)
n
i=1,
collecting the times (ti)
n
i=1 of the first n arrivals, and the message mti , the action ati
and the benefit bti in each such time-ti arrival. A type θ’s private history of length n
is a list
hθn = (hn, (yti)
n
i=1),
consisting of the length-n public history and her private signals in the first n arrivals.
Let Hn be the set of length-n public histories, let H := ∪∞n=0Hn, and let h ∈ H
denote a generic public history. Likewise, let Hθn be the set of type θ’s length-n
private histories, let Hθ := ∪∞n=0Hθn, and let hθ ∈ Hθ denote a generic type θ’s private
history.
Strategies. Each expert type θ’s strategy is a collection σθ = (σθt )t≥0, where each
σθt : H
θ × S → ∆M
is a measurable mapping that takes her history hθ and the current signal y to a
distribution over messages at each arrival time t, subject to the restriction that all
arrival times in the history hθ are strictly smaller than t. Let σ := (σI , σU).
9
Each principal’s strategy is to choose an action given a public history h and
a current message m at his arrival time t. Since the principal is short-lived, he
chooses the myopically optimal action and obtains a benefit that I denote by b∗t (h,m).
Moreover, whenever a principal is indifferent between the two actions, without loss, I
assume that he follows a pure strategy of matching his action to the last revealed state
(hereafter, the last state); this follows from the fact that the principal’s action does
not affect the information of the expert or future principals as well as future wages.
Finally, when specifying an equilibrium below, I omit the principals’ strategies to ease
the notation.
Beliefs. At each time t, the uninformed expert forms a public belief that the current
state equals the last state. I denote this public belief by qt. Because state transitions
are Markov, qt is plainly a function of the time-lapse l since the last state was revealed
and is given by qt =
1
2
(1 + e−2γl) =: µl. This public state belief is depicted in Figure
1.1. Crucially, µl >
1
2
for each l ≥ 0. Thus, between the two possible states, the
public state belief dictates that the current state is more likely to match the last
state than to mismatch it. The belief falls as the time-lapse l grows, and it falls at a
faster rate with l the higher is the state volatility γ.
I denote by qIt the informed expert’s time-t belief that the current state equals
the last state. At each time t absent a principal’s arrival, qIt coincides with the public
state belief qt. At each time t when a principal arrives, the informed expert’s state
belief qIt jumps to either 1 or 0, depending on the private signal that she receives.
Given a strategy σ and a public history h at time t, an arriving principal forms a
belief on the expert’s type and the current state, i.e., on the set Θ × S. This belief
is a pair (pt, qt), where pt denotes the public belief that the expert is informed and
qt = µl is the public belief that the state is equal to the last state given a time-lapse














Figure 1.1: Public state belief
generic pair (p, q), or (p, µ), as the public type and state beliefs or simply the public
beliefs.
Wage. In each arrival, the wage that a principal pays the expert equals his expected
marginal benefit from receiving the expert’s advice. If a principal with state belief µ
had to choose an action without the expert’s advice, he would have optimally matched
his action with the last state, deriving an expected benefit of 2µ − 1. Thus, given a
strategy σ and a history of play where a principal arrives at time t with associated
public history h and state belief µ, the wage at the arrival is
wt := E[b
∗
t (h,m)|h]− (2µ− 1), (1.1)
where the expectation is taken over messages m that the expert sends according to
the strategy σ, conditional on the public history h.
Equilibrium. The solution concept that I use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In
such an equilibrium, denoted by (σ, ϕ), each type’s strategy σθ in the profile σ is
optimal given the beliefs ϕ := (pt, qt, q
I
t )t≥0 and the beliefs are consistent with the
strategy profile σ wherever possible. The set of messages is an ingredient of the
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solution concept. In the spirit of Myerson (1986), I assume that M = Θ×S, allowing
each type to disclose all her relevant private information in each arrival. A message
is a pair m = (θ̂, ŷ), interpreted as an expert’s report on her type and current signal.
I focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria that satisfy Properties 1.1 and 1.2 below,
henceforth “equilibria.” Property 1.1 concerns the informed type’s behavior on path:
Property 1.1. On path, in each arrival, the informed type reports her private infor-
mation truthfully, i.e., upon observing a current signal y = s, she sends a message
m = (θI , s).
Property 1.1 can be interpreted as a social convention, where the informed type is
expected to give advice on the basis of some code of ethics or fiduciary duty. Given
Property 1.1, it is without loss to assume that an uninformed type never sends the
messages (θU , s̄) or (θU ,
¯
s), as these messages fully reveal her type and lead to zero
future wages. Hence, I further simply the structure of the message set and maintain
the assumption throughout that
M = S.
Each message is therefore interpreted as a report on the current signal. I say that an
action, a signal or a report is correct if it matches the current state, and is incorrect
otherwise. I also say that an action, a state, a signal or a report is agreeing with respect
to the public state belief if it matches the last state, and is disagreeing otherwise.
In equilibrium, beliefs are updated by Bayes rule not only on path but also off
path. Because Bayes’ rule does not apply when beliefs are degenerate, an assumption
is necessary to pin down what happens following degenerate beliefs off path. Property
1.2 takes care of this:
Property 1.2. In each arrival with beliefs (p, µ) where either p or µ is degenerate, if
the expert sends a message that is inconsistent with the strategy and the beliefs, then
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the expert’s reputation jumps to zero.
The analysis readily extends to allowing for other off-path beliefs. In Section 1.5,
I discuss the consequences of doing so.
1.3 Equilibrium
In this section, I present my main result, characterizing the equilibrium. To streamline
the presentation, I describe the result in a series of propositions. I begin by deriving
the basic structure of any equilibrium. I then show that an equilibrium exists. Finally,
I show that all equilibria exhibit qualitatively identical properties, and examine the
properties in detail. Proofs are in the Appendix. In Section 1.4, I interpret the formal
results in this section and discuss their implications.
1.3.1 Basic Structure
In any equilibrium, by Property 1.1, the informed type reports truthfully on path.
Much difficulty in characterizing equilibria rests upon characterizing the uninformed
type’s strategy, because the set of her strategies is large. I first derive properties
that the uninformed type’s continuation payoffs and strategies must satisfy in any
equilibrium. I then examine the principals’ best responses given the uninformed
type’s equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 1.1. In any equilibrium, the following properties hold:
1. Payoffs—there is a strictly increasing function V U : [0, 1] → R+ such that at
any uninformed type’s history hU where an arrival ends with reputation p after
the principal’s benefit is realized, the uninformed type’s continuation payoff is
V U(p). Moreover, V U(0) = 0.
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2. Behavior—in each arrival, the uninformed type’s strategy is Markov in the public
beliefs (p, µ).
The monotone payoff structure reflects the fact that the uninformed expert is
motivated by reputation concerns to appear informed. As the principals expect the
informed type to truthfully report her signals, their willingness to pay strictly in-
creases in the expert’s reputation, holding fixed the uninformed type’s continuation
strategy. The uninformed type thus benefits from a higher reputation. When the
reputation is zero, the principals do not find the expert’s reports to be valuable, so
the uninformed expert’s continuation payoff equals zero.
In each arrival, given binary states, without loss, I take the uninformed expert’s
strategy to be a probability of sending an agreeing report. The uninformed expert
chooses the agreeing probability to maximize her continuation payoff upon sending
a report. This continuation payoff depends solely on the public state belief that
the report is correct and the expert’s current reputation; the latter determines the
resulting reputation if the report turns out to be correct, given the chosen agreeing
probability. (If the report turns out to be incorrect, the resulting reputation is zero.)
Thus, her strategy is Markov in the public beliefs.
The Markovian structure simplifies the task of characterizing equilibria:
Corollary 1.1. If an equilibrium exists, then it is characterized by some agreeing
function α : [0, 1] × (1
2
, 1] → [0, 1] that determines the uninformed expert’s agreeing
probability αp,µ in each arrival given public beliefs (p, µ) ∈ [0, 1]× (12 , 1].
Given that the principals expect the informed type to report truthfully, the in-
formed type has no profitable deviation to misreport in an arrival. From her per-
spective, a deviation to misreport must result in a reputation of zero and thus zero
future wages, giving her the lowest possible continuation payoff. Thus, without loss,
I assume that upon any deviation by the informed type, she sends an agreeing report
in every future arrival.
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Equilibrium existence
By Corollary 1.1, any equilibrium is characterized by some uninformed expert’s agree-
ing function given which the uninformed type finds no profitable deviation when prin-
cipals the uninformed type’s play follows such an agreeing function. Hence, to prove
that an equilibrium exists, it suffices to show that there exists an agreeing function
α that maximizes the uninformed type’s equilibrium payoff, and then to verify that
when the principals expect the uninformed type’s play follows such an agreeing func-
tion, the uninformed type has no profitable deviation. The next result shows that an
equilibrium exists.
Lemma 1.1. An equilibrium exists.
In general, there are multiple equilibria, each characterized by an agreeing function
given which the uninformed type finds no profitable deviation when principals the
uninformed type’s play follows such an agreeing function. In the following, I show
that all equilibria exhibit qualitatively identical properties. I also describe these
properties in detail, as they are crucial for understanding the crisis of expertise.
Fix an arbitrary agreeing function ᾱ that characterizes an equilibrium. Since the
function ᾱ is arbitrarily chosen, hereafter, I refer to the equilibrium that the function
characterizes simply as the equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the function ᾱ must satisfy the uninformed type’s incentive con-







− (1− µ)V U
(
p




≥ 0, if ᾱp,µ = 1,
= 0, if ᾱp,µ ∈ (0, 1),
≤ 0, if ᾱp,µ = 0.
(1.2)
The left side of the constraint is the difference between the uninformed expert’s
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continuation payoff by agreeing and by disagreeing. From her perspective, an agreeing
report is correct with probability µ. While an incorrect report leads to zero reputation




Likewise, her continuation payoff by disagreeing, noting that such report is correct
with probability 1− µ and a correct such report leads to reputation
p
p+ (1− p)(1− ᾱp,µ)
. (1.4)
When the reputation p is positive, uniqueness of the agreeing probability arises from
the uninformed type’s reputation concerns. By choosing too high an agreeing prob-
ability, the reputation reward by sending a correct, disagreeing report is large, as
principals expect that such report is more likely to be sent by an informed type.
Likewise, by choosing too low an agreeing probability, the reputation reward by send-
ing a correct, agreeing report is large, as principals expect that such report is more
likely to be sent by an informed type.
Finally, if the reputation p is zero, then the uninformed expert’s continuation
payoff is zero. Thus, any strategy by the uninformed type is optimal. Without loss,





I next examine the principals’ best responses given the uninformed type’s strategy ᾱ.
From each principal’s perspective, if he knew that the expert is informed, he would
match his action with the expert’s report. In contrast, if he knew that the expert
is uninformed, then he would optimally choose an agreeing action irrespective of the
report. Because the principal is unsure of the expert’s type, the equilibrium outcome
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is constrained inefficient.
In each arrival with beliefs (p, µ) , given that the informed type reports truthfully
and the uninformed type reports according to the agreeing function ᾱ, the principal
optimally matches his action with an agreeing report, as the agreeing report reinforces
the public belief that the agreeing action is more likely to be correct. Specifically, the
principal’s belief that the report is correct given that it is disagreeing strictly exceeds
one half irrespective of the value of ᾱp,µ ∈ [0, 1]:
pµ
pµ+ (1− p)ᾱp,µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
principal’s belief that expert is




pµ+ (1− p)ᾱp,µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
principal’s belief that expert is
uninformed upon agreeing report
)
× µ > 1
2
.
In contrast, the principal matches his action with a disagreeing report if and only if
p(1− µ)
p(1− µ) + (1− p)(1− ᾱp,µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
principal’s belief that expert is




p(1− µ) + (1− p)(1− ᾱp,µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
principal’s belief that expert is
uninformed upon disagreeing report
)
× (1− µ) > 1
2
.
The left side is the principal’s belief that the report is correct given that it is dis-
agreeing. The inequality is equivalent to writing




Condition (1.5) admits a intuitive interpretation. The principal matches his action
with a disagreeing report if and only if he is sufficiently confident that the disagreeing
report is sent by an informed type. This is the case when the uninformed types
agreeing probability is sufficiently high.
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1.3.2 Characterization
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium. Given the agreeing function ᾱ, define
a correspondence C : [0, 1] ⇒ (1
2
, 1] such that
C(p) := {µ ∈ (1
2
, 1] : ᾱp,µ ≤ κp,µ}. (1.6)
Given reputation p, the set C(p) contains the state beliefs µ given which, in view of the
preceding discussion, the agreeing probability ᾱp,µ is sufficiently low that principals
prefer to ignore the expert’s advice and choose the agreeing action. Summarizing the
previous discussion:
Proposition 1.2. In the equilibrium, in each arrival with beliefs (p, µ), if µ ∈ C(p),
then the principal chooses an agreeing action independently of the expert’s report.
Otherwise, the principal matches his action with the expert’s report.
In view of Proposition 1.2, hereafter, I refer to graph(C) as the crisis region. I
refer to a history of play at which the public beliefs (p, µ) are in the crisis region
conditional on the expert being informed as a crisis of expertise. In the equilibrium,
wages reflect the crises.
Corollary 1.2. In the equilibrium, in each arrival with beliefs (p, µ), the wage is zero
if (p, µ) is in the crisis region and is positive otherwise.
In the equilibrium, in each arrival with beliefs (p, µ), the wage is
max
(
p+ (1− p)ᾱp,µ(2µ− 1)− (2µ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal benefit of matching




The arriving principal finds expert advice to be valuable if and only if he anticipates to
match his action with the expert’s report, that is, the principals’ perceived marginal
benefit of matching his action with the expert’s report is positive.
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α1/5,μ























Figure 1.2: Agreeing probability (γ = 1, r = 1)
In the remainder of this section, I explore in detail the structure of the agreeing
function ᾱ and the crisis correspondence C. I begin with the agreeing function,
elucidating the uninformed type’s incentives to “gamble” for her reputation:
Proposition 1.3. For every (p, µ), ᾱp,µ ≥ 12 . Moreover:
1. Lower state belief, more gambling—for every p > 0, there is µ∗ ≡ µ∗(p) such
that ᾱp,µ strictly increases in µ on (
1
2
, µ∗] and equals 1 if µ ∈ (µ∗, 1].
2. Lower reputation, more gambling—for every µ ∈ (1
2
, 1], ᾱp,µ increases in p;
further, µ∗(p) strictly decreases in p, satisfying µ∗(0) = 1 and µ∗(1) = 1
2
.
The agreeing probability always exceeds 1
2
due to the uninformed type’s incentive
to pool with the informed type. From the uninformed type’s perspective, the informed
type is more likely to agree than to disagree. In turn, in equilibrium, the reputation
upon correctly disagreeing, as given by (1.4), must strictly exceed that upon correctly
agreeing, as given by (1.3). By Proposition 1.1, the uninformed expert’s reputation
concerns provide her with incentives to disagree, gambling on the less likely event
that disagreeing is correct for the larger reputation reward if disagreeing turns out to
be correct.
Part 1 of Proposition 1.3 says that public information of high quality about the
state disciplines the uninformed type’s gambling. Given a higher state belief, the
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uninformed type’s gambling incentive is lower as she believes that disagreeing is more
likely to be incorrect. State beliefs above the cutoff µ∗ “preempt” the uninformed
type’s gambling. On the other hand, state beliefs that are arbitrarily close to 1
2
give
the strongest gambling incentive to the uninformed type, who then reports both states
with approximately equal probabilities. To illustrate, Figure 1.2a numerically plots
the agreeing probability ᾱp,µ against the state belief µ, assuming that the reputation
is p = 1/5, in a setting where the state volatility is γ = 1 and the discount rate is
r = 1.
Part 2 of the proposition says that given a higher current reputation, the unin-
formed type agrees with a higher probability. This is because the reputation gain by
correctly disagreeing is then smaller. To illustrate, Figure 1.2b numerically plots the
agreeing probability against the state belief for several values of reputations, again
taking γ = 1 and r = 1.
My next proposition concerns the structure of the crisis correspondence C and
elucidate the principals’ incentives.
Proposition 1.4. For every p, the correspondence C satisfies 1 ∈ C(p). Moreover:
1. Given a positive reputation, high enough interior state beliefs preempt the crisis—
for every p > 0, there exists µ̄ < 1 such that µ /∈ C(p) if µ ∈ [µ̄, 1).
2. Given a positive reputation, low enough state beliefs preempt the crisis—for
every p > 0, there exists
¯





3. Higher reputation p, smaller C(p)—there is p̄ ∈ [0, 1) such that C(p) ( C(p′) if
p′ < p < p̄. Further, C(0) = (1
2
, 1] and C(p) = {1} if p ≥ p̄.
The set C(p) contains the unit state belief for every reputation p. When arriving
with a unit state belief, each principal chooses an agreeing action as his state belief























(b) p = 1/2
Figure 1.3: Agreeing probability and cutoff (γ = 1, r = 1)
agree in such arrival, inducing an agreeing action by the principal. On the other
hand, if the expert deviates to disagree, then by Property 1.2, the principal attaches
probability zero to the expert being informed and thus chooses the agreeing action.
Part 1 of Proposition 1.4 says that in any arrival where the reputation p is positive,
the set C(p) excludes high enough interior state beliefs. This shows that unless the
public information about the state is conclusive, an arriving principal chooses an
agreeing action on the basis of the public information irrespective of the expert’s
report only if the quality of public information about the state is low. A principal
who arrives with a high enough state belief expects little gambling by the uninformed
type, and thus matches his action with the report.
Part 2 says that the set C(p) also excludes low enough state beliefs. A principal
arriving with a low enough state belief matches his action with the expert’s report,
as he expects that the current state is sufficiently likely to have switched from the
last state, and a disagreeing report is sent by an informed type.
Finally, Part 3 says that given a higher reputation, an arriving principal not only
believes that the expert is more likely to be informed, but the principal also expects
less gambling by the uninformed type in view of Proposition 1.3. To illustrate the
result, consider Figure 1.3a. The set C(1
5
) in the figure is the interval of state beliefs
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µ given which ᾱ1/5,µ ≤ κ1/5,µ, again taking γ = 1 and r = 1.8 In contrast, in Figure
1.3b, the set C(1
2
) contains only the unit state belief.
1.4 Implications
In this section, I leverage the equilibrium characterization to address the motivating
questions in the opening paragraphs. I then discuss policy implications for alleviating
the crisis.
1.4.1 Value of Informed Experts and Long-run Predictions
How does principals’ access to public information affect the value of the informed
expert and her genuine advice? In Section 1.3, I have been silent about the equilib-
rium payoff structure of the informed expert. Indeed, given that the informed expert
reports the state truthfully in each arrival on path, it is a priori unclear how the
uninformed expert’s gambling affects the value of the informed expert to the princi-
pals. My next proposition shows that in the equilibrium, the informed type, like the
uninformed type, also benefits from a higher reputation.
Proposition 1.5. In the equilibrium, there is a strictly increasing function V I(·; ᾱ) :
[0, 1]→ R+ such that at any history hI where an arrival ends with reputation p after
the principal’s benefit is realized, the informed type’s continuation payoff is V I(p; ᾱ).
Moreover, V I(0; ᾱ) = 0.
The result follows because the equilibrium wage (1.7) strictly increases in the
expert’s reputation in view of Proposition 1.3. Given a higher reputation, principals
8. In general, a sharper characterization that addresses whether C(p) defines a connected subset
of state beliefs in ( 12 , 1] for any reputation p as in Figure 1.3a is an open question. The answer to this
question hinges crucially upon the curvature of the agreeing probability ᾱp,µ in each state belief µ.
As illustrated in Figure 1.2b, the curvature is in general non-monotone in the state beliefs, making
an analytical characterization difficult to obtain due to the high dimensionality of the program (∗).
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not only expect that the expert is more likely to be informed, but also that the
uninformed type gambles less.
Further, Proposition 1.6 below shows that the informed expert’s reputation in-
creases over time, as her reports are always correct on path. Let P denote the
probability measure over the set of outcomes of the game induced in the equilibrium.
Proposition 1.6. In the equilibrium, on path, the reputation path (pt)t≥0 is increasing
conditional on the expert being informed. Moreover, given any time t, for every ε > 0,
there exists
¯
T > 0 such that
P[pt < pt+T , T ≥
¯
T |θ = θI ] > 1− ε.
The two propositions offer a perspective on why, despite concerns about the cri-
sis of expertise, reputable experts who have consistently issued correct forecasts are
competitively sought after in, for instance, financial markets (see, e.g., Hong, Kubik,
and Solomon, 2000; Hong and Kubik, 2003), business consulting (see, e.g., Bourgoin
and Harvey, 2018), or entrepreneurship (see, e.g., Baddeley, 2018) in practice.
Importantly, because the informed expert’s reputation increases over time, Propo-
sition 1.7 below shows that the crisis of expertise disappears in the long run: principals
act on the basis of expert advice irrespective of the quality of public information, even
when they are skeptical of the expert’s ability.
Proposition 1.7. In the equilibrium, for every ε > 0, there exists T ≥ 0 such that
P[qt /∈ C(pt), t ≥ T |θ = θI ] > 1− ε. (1.8)
Once the informed type’s reputation becomes sufficiently large, and hence all
her future reputations are sufficiently large by Proposition 1.6, the public beliefs
permanently exit the crisis region by by Proposition 1.4.
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More generally, the constrained inefficiency in the equilibrium dissipates over time.
If the expert is informed, then once the public beliefs permanently exit the crisis
region, each arriving principal efficiently matches his action with the expert’s correct
report by Proposition 1.4.9 On the other hand, if the expert is uninformed, then her
reputation increases over time until she sends an incorrect report. As her reputation
increases, she agrees and thus induces agreeing actions with higher probabilities. Once
an incorrect report reveals her type, future principals only choose agreeing actions.
The results speak to the recent concerns in the retail financial advice industry.
Take for example the case of Patricia Russell, who appeared in 2019 on LinkedIn as a
certified financial planner and a graduate from prestigious universities. Her financial
advice was quoted in major media outlets, allowing Patricia to benefit from an unde-
serving reputation as a financial expert before she was discovered to be fake.10 The
discovery of Russell and other fake financial advisors attracted considerable concerns
that the presence of these fake experts diminishes the value of informed financial ad-
visors and their genuine advice.11 The present results suggest that although gambling
by the uninformed type undermines the value of the informed expert’s correct advice,
the damage it causes on the informed expert’s payoff dissipates in the long run.
Finally, in the equilibrium, the principals also learn about the uninformed expert
over time.
Proposition 1.8. In the equilibrium, on path, the reputation path (pt)t≥0 is increasing
until it jumps down to zero and stays at zero thereafter, conditional on the expert being
9. In particular, if the informed expert is arbitrarily patient, the informed type’s equilibrium payoff
tends to the equilibrium payoff that she would have obtained if her type is commonly known at the
outset.
10. See “How This Fake Financial Expert Tricked Outlets Into Publishing Her Advice”, Huffpost,
August 1, 2019.
11. See “Fake ‘Expert’ Diminishes the Value of Genuine Financial Help”, The Seattle Times,
August 24, 2019.
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uninformed. Moreover, for every ε > 0, there exists T > 0 such that
P[pt > 0, t ≥ T |θ = θU ] < ε.
Thus, the equilibrium outcome features a “fly-by-night” nature that many unin-
formed experts exhibit in practice, as in the case of Patricia Russell. In each arrival,
the uninformed type is plainly betting on either the event that agreeing is correct
or the event that disagreeing is correct. By luck, the uninformed type might send
a number of correct reports, building an (undeserving) reputation in the short run.
Given a large enough time, there are likely to be a large number of arrivals, and the
uninformed type is likely to have sent an incorrect report and to have revealed her
type. An example that illustrates such short-term reputation building is the case of
Raoul Pal. While Pal successfully predicted the 2008 financial crisis, he also predicted
that in 2012, the “biggest banking crisis in world history” and a series of sovereign
defaults would take place.12 These events, of course, did not happen. The financial
advisory firm Vestory explicitly uses Pal as an example and writes: “Beware of the
financial media spouting predictions. More than half the time, they are wrong, and
when they’re right, it’s more likely only because they got lucky.”13
1.4.2 The Implications of Public Information
Next, I turn to examine the equilibrium implications of public information. Is the cri-
sis due to the abundance of public information? And if so, is it simply a phenomenon
where decision makers substitute high-quality public information for expert advice?
Briefly, the results in this section speak to the two faces of public information tech-
nologies like social media for decision-making: while the technologies allow decision
12. See, e.g., “Former Hedge Funder Presents A Terrifying Vision Of THE END GAME,” Business
Insider, June 2, 2012.
13. See “Fake Financial News,” Vestory, April 27, 2020.
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makers to have easier access to resources that improve their decision-making, they
also allow uninformed experts to spring to life at the expense of the decision makers.
On the one hand, public information is beneficial because it facilitates the prin-
cipals’ learning about the state and the expert’s type, as shown in the preceding
analysis. Their learning about the state improves their decision-making by increasing
their reservation payoffs if they were to choose actions independently of expert ad-
vice. Moreover, the principals’ learning about the expert’s type not only improves the
quality of their decisions concerning whether to match their actions with the expert’s
reports, but also improves the quality of expert advice by mitigating the uninformed
type’s gambling.
On the other hand, in the equilibrium, public information about the state also fa-
cilitates the uninformed type’s learning and in turn harms the principals. Specifically,
in each arrival, the uninformed expert learns how to better pool with the informed
type. As a result, in view of Proposition 1.3, she is more likely to agree than to
disagree in each arrival. In turn, a “contrarian-rewarding convention” endogenously
arises, in the sense that a correctly disagreeing report gives both types of experts
a higher continuation payoff than a correctly agreeing report: in each arrival with














In the face of such convention, the uninformed type faces incentives to gamble for
her reputation at the expense of the principals. In particular, she uses the public
information about the state to learn how to gamble.
In reality, conventions that reward successful contrarians are common and often
appear in the form of implicit incentives. For example, the careers of financial an-
alysts and entrepreneurs typically prosper upon accurate contrarian forecasts (see,
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e.g., Baddeley, 2018; Bozanic, Chen, and Jung, 2019). My results rationalize such
conventions.
My results also shed light on recent empirical evidence on experts’ gambling pat-
terns in the face of these conventions in the financial industries. For example, Bozanic
et al. (2019) find that financial analysts who work at lower-tier brokerage houses are
more likely to make calls contrary to the public beliefs for their career advancement.
1.4.3 The Case for Public Information
In recent decades, despite the concerns that the abundance of public information
may have contributed to the crisis, political campaigns and consumer groups have
consistently advocated the need to equip client advisees with higher-quality public
information so that the clients can substitute public information for low-quality expert
advice (see, e.g., Howells, 2005). My results support these advocates to improve the
quality of public information but for a different reason. My results suggest that higher
quality of public information undermines gambling incentives by uninformed experts,
and thus complementarily improves the quality of expert advice.14
The preceding discussions thus suggest that policies such that frequent auditing
of experts, motivating the production of public information, and higher standards of
expert certifications can be effective measures for alleviating the crisis of expertise
and improving the quality of decision-making.
Consider first frequent auditing. Specifically, consider increasing the principals’
arrival intensity from unity to some larger number. The interpretation is that some
of these arriving principals are identical to those in the baseline model who care
about matching their actions with the states, while the other arriving principals are
14. Interestingly, this observation resonates with the recent findings in the survey “Trust and
Mistrust in Americans’s Views of Scientific Experts” by the Pew Research Center. The survey
documents that confidence in scientific experts is higher among survey participants who possess
higher science knowledge (Funk, Hefferon, Kennedy, and Johnson, 2019).
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inspectors who audit the expert. Given a high enough arrival rate, principals on
average are likely to arrive with sufficiently high state beliefs, alleviating the crisis.
Similarly, policies that motivate frequent production of public information about
the state can alleviate the crisis. Specifically, suppose that public news arrives as
an independent Poisson process (Zt)t≥0 such that upon each news arrival, the cur-
rent state is publicly revealed. In this setting, the agreeing function ᾱ continues to
characterize an equilibrium. This is because news arrival is exogenous and does not
affect the expert’s incentives in each arrival, conditional on the public beliefs. As in
the case of frequent auditing, if news arrives sufficiently frequently, then principals
on average arrive with sufficiently high state beliefs, alleviating the crisis.
Finally, higher certification standards that sufficiently improve the prior reputa-
tion can help to preempt the crisis. Indeed, as Proposition 1.4 highlights, if the
prior belief p0 is sufficiently high, and hence all reputations that arise on path are
sufficiently high, then the crisis happens with probability zero.
My next result suggests that these policies to alleviate the crisis of expertise are
“most needed” in environments where the state is neither too stable nor too volatile.
Specifically, I show that the probability that some principal arrives in a crisis in
the equilibrium, namely the probability that some principal arrives with beliefs in
the crisis region conditional on the expert being informed, vanishes when the state
volatility is too small or too large.
Given any history of play at which an arrival ends with resulting reputation p, the
probability that some future principal arrives in a crisis is a function of p, denoted












































Figure 1.4: Probability that some principal arrives in a crisis (r = 1)
The probability that some principal arrives in a crisis in the equilibrium is λ(p0).
Proposition 1.9. For every ε > 0, there exists
¯
γ and γ̄, where 0 <
¯
γ < γ̄ <∞, such
that for each γ /∈ (
¯
γ, γ̄), in the equilibrium,
λ(p0) < ε. (1.9)
In an environment where the state volatility is very low, principals on average
arrive when the quality of public information is very high and disciplines the unin-
formed expert’s gambling. In contrast, in an environment where the state volatility
is very high, principals on average arrive when the quality of public information is
very noisy, making the principals virtually indifferent between the two actions absent
expert advice and thereby neglecting the uninformed expert’s gambling.
Establishing comparative statics of the equilibrium probability that principals ar-
rive in crises in relation to the volatility γ is less tractable, given the high dimensional-
ity of the program (∗). Nonetheless, it is straightforward to obtain them numerically.
Figure 1.4 plots the probability against the prior reputation p0 conditional on the
expert being informed, and Figure 1.5 plots the agreeing probability against the state
belief, given several values of volatility γ. Figure 1.4 suggests that the probability is


























Figure 1.5: Agreeing probabilities (r = 1, p = 1/5)
Proposition 1.9. At intermediate values of γ, principals are more likely to arrive with
intermediate state beliefs that fall in the crisis region; moreover, the uninformed type
has the strongest incentives to gamble at intermediate levels of volatility, as depicted
in Figure 1.5.
To understand why the gambling incentives are strongest at intermediate levels of
volatility, consider Figure 1.6 which plots the uninformed expert’s continuation payoff
in the equilibrium. At γ = 1, the convexity of the payoff at low reputation values
gives the uninformed expert strong gambling incentives. In contrast, such convexity
at low reputations vanishes for large γ, as the principals are likely to arrive with
state beliefs of virtually 1/2 and therefore, according to (1.7), pay the expert wages
approximately equal to the expert’s reputations. Such convexity also vanishes for
small γ, as the principals are likely to arrive with state beliefs of virtually one and
pay the expert negligible wages.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have developed a simple model of expert advice to examine the crisis
of expertise. The crisis has attracted considerable attention amid recent technological















Figure 1.6: Uninformed type’s continuation payoff
the crisis is an equilibrium phenomenon where decision makers dismiss the correct
advice provided by informed experts and act solely on the basis of their noisy public
information. I find that decision makers ignore valuable expert advice only when
the quality of the public information is low, as it is then when uninformed experts
have stronger incentives to gamble for their reputations at the expense of the decision
makers. My analysis suggests that policies such as frequent auditing of experts,
motivating the production of high-quality public information, and higher standards
of expert certifications can be effective measures for alleviating the crisis of expertise.
I close the paper with a brief discussion of some of the assumptions that I made
in my analysis. First, I have imposed Property 1.2 in my solution concept. Property
1.2 ensures that when an expert incorrectly reports the state given a reputation of
one, then her reputation jumps down to zero. While the analysis readily extends
to allowing for other off-path reputations, the property ensures that the principals’
updating of the expert’s reputation does not exhibit a discontinuity at reputation one.
Indeed, if the uninformed expert reports incorrectly when her reputation is short of
unity, then her reputation jumps down to zero.
Property 1.2 also ensures that when a principal arrives with a public state belief of
one, then he chooses an agreeing action even if the expert sends a disagreeing report
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(off path), as the principal then believes that the expert is uninformed for sure. The
analysis readily extends to allowing for other off-path beliefs by the principals. Such
off-path beliefs would not affect the uninformed expert’s incentives, as the event that
principals arrive with unit state belief happens with probability zero.
Another assumption that I made is that the public information available to prin-
cipals and experts consists only of past advice and past action outcomes. In reality,
there may be public shocks, e.g., a pandemic, that arrive at random times and pro-
duce information about the state. Suppose that high shocks and low shocks arrive
as independent Poisson processes (Z̄t)t≥0 and (
¯
Zt)t≥0 such that upon each arrival of
a high (resp., low) shock, the current state publicly jumps to θ̄ (resp.,
¯
θ). In this set-
ting, like in the public-news setting discussed in Section 1.4.3, the agreeing function
ᾱ continues to characterize an equilibrium.
Finally, I have assumed that the state is binary. The analysis readily extends
to more than two states if, for each principal, the benefit that he receives from not
matching the state is independent of what non-matching action he chooses, while
his benefit from matching the state is higher. If the payoff structure is different,
for instance, if the state is a real number and each principal has a quadratic loss
function such that he strictly prefers an action that is closer to the state, then the
fundamental notion of agreeing and disagreeing, and more importantly the notion of
a crisis of expertise, do not carry over. The nature of the problem is then different
and is beyond the scope of this paper. I view this as a promising venue for future
research.
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1.6 Appendix A: Proofs
1.6.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Given any equilibrium, let VU(hU) denote the uninformed type’s continuation payoff
at the end of an arrival when the principal’s benefit is realized such that her history
is updated to hU .
I first show that in any equilibrium, given any history hU , the uninformed type’s
continuation payoff V U(hU) strictly increases in the associated reputation p. Fix
an equilibrium profile (σ, ϕ). Given any play history at which an arrival ends with
reputation p and history hU , consider the uninformed expert’s continuation payoff
VU(hU). To emphasize the associated reputation p ≡ p(hU), in the following, I
rewrite VU(hU) as VU(hU ; p). Let σU |hU denote the uninformed type’s continuation
strategy. The expected wage in the next principal’s arrival is
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+1)l w(p, µl;α) dl,
where
w(p, µl;α) := max(p+ (1− p)(2µ− 1)(2αl − 1)− (2µl − 1), 0)
represents the flow wage given that the uninformed expert sends an agreeing message
with probability αl when the next principal arrives given a time-lapse l in the future.
Suppose that the reputation p increases to some p′ > p and consider the continuation
game. By choosing the continuation strategy σU |hU (which is feasible), the uninformed
expert’s continuation payoff is V̂U(hU ; p′) > VU(hU ; p), as w(·; p′, ·) > w(·; p, ·) and
the probabilities that her messages match the states in each future arrival remain the
same. Since the equilibrium payoff VU(hU ; p′) in the continuation game must be at
least V̂U(hU ; p′), the claim follows.
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Next, I show that in any equilibrium, there exists a strictly increasing function
V U : [0, 1]→ R+ such that given any history hU at the end of an arrival with associ-
ated reputation p ∈ [0, 1], VU(hU) = V U(p). In equilibrium, the informed expert plays
a strategy σ̄I given which she reports truthfully in each arrival. I establish several
key properties that the uninformed expert’s continuation payoffs at each history must
satisfy in any equilibrium. I then use these properties to characterize the uninformed
expert’s equilibrium strategy.
Fix an uninformed expert’s equilibrium strategy σU . First, given any two histories
hU , h̃U at which an arrival ends with an identical reputation p, VU(hU) = VU(h̃U) =:
V U(p) for some function V U , for otherwise the uninformed expert has a profitable
deviation at either hU or h̃U . Clearly, V U(0) = 0 because all future wages are zero.
Now, in any equilibrium, at any history of play where a principal arrives with
public beliefs (p, µ) and the uninformed expert faces a history hU , the uninformed







− (1− µ)V U
(
p




≥ 0, if αhU = 1,
= 0, if αhU ∈ (0, 1),
≤ 0, if αhU = 0.




1, if µ ≥ µ∗(p),
ᾱp,µ, otherwise,
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= (1− µ)V U
(
p




Because V U is strictly increasing and µ > 1
2
, α∗p,µ ∈ (12 , 1]. In contrast, if p = 0, then
any αhU is optimal because V
U(0; ᾱ) = 0 independently of the uninformed type’s
agreeing probability.
Observe that the uninformed expert’s equilibrium strategy in the arrival must
therefore be Markov in the public beliefs (p, µ). Moreover, it is unique if p > 0.
Finally, because V U(·; ᾱ) is strictly increasing, the agreeing probability increases in p
by construction.
1.6.2 Proof of Lemma 1.1
Let L ≡ L∞([0, 1] × (1
2
, 1]; [0, 1]) be the set of Lebesgue measurable functions that
map from [0, 1] × (1
2
, 1] to [0, 1]. Since each agreeing function α ∈ L characterizes
a candidate equilibrium, it induces a set P (α) ⊆ [0, 1] of reputations that arise at
the end of each arrival on path, as well as a function V U(·;α) : [0, 1] → R+ such
that V U(p;α) represents the uninformed type’s continuation payoff at the end of each
arrival that results in reputation p after the principal’s benefit is realized.




Clearly, the objective in the problem (∗) is continuous in α when L is endowed with
the weak-∗ topology. Moreover, L is weak-∗ compact, as L∞([0, 1] × (1
2
, 1];R) is the
dual of L1([0, 1] × (1
2
, 1];R) and hence the unit ball L = {α ∈ L∞([0, 1] × (1
2
, 1];R) :
‖α‖∞ ≤ 1} is weak-∗ compact by Alaoglu’s theorem (e.g., Aliprantis and Border,
2006, Theorem 6.21). Thus, a solution to the program exists and the supremum is
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attained as a maximum. Moreover, the function V U(p, s;α), holding fixed the agreeing
probability αp,µ,s induced by the agreeing function as constant for each (p, µ, s), is
continuous in p ∈ [0, 1]. For each (p, µ) ∈ (0, 1] × (1
2
, 1], the equilibrium agreeing
probability ᾱp,µ ∈ [0, 1] is characterized by (1.2). Such ᾱp,µ ∈ [0, 1] exists, because
V U(p; ᾱ) is continuous in p and is strictly increasing.
1.6.3 Proof of Proposition 1.2
The result is clear from the discussion in the main text.
1.6.4 Proof of Corollary 1.2
It is straightforward to verify that
w(p, µ;α) = (p+ (1− p)(2µ− 1)(2ᾱp,µ − 1)− (2µ− 1))+ > 0 ⇐⇒ µ /∈ C(p).
1.6.5 Proof of Proposition 1.3
I have shown that the agreeing probability exceeds 1/2 given any beliefs (p, µ), as
well as part 1 in the proof of Proposition 1.1. It remains to show part 2. The cutoff
is
µ∗(p) = min{µ ∈ [1
2
, 1] : µV U(p; ᾱ) ≥ (1− µ)V U(1; ᾱ)}.
Since V U is strictly increasing, µ∗ is strictly decreasing. Since V U(0) = 0, µ∗(0) = 1.
1.6.6 Proof of Proposition 1.4
That 1 ∈ C(p) for any reputation p ∈ [0, 1] follows by definition of C. To show part 1
and part 2, note that by definition of ᾱ and κ, there exists µ∗ < 1 such that for every
µ ∈ [µ∗, 1], ᾱp,µ = 1 but κp,µ < 1. Thus, the set C(p) excludes high enough interior
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for each µ ∈ (1
2
, 1], the set C(p) also excludes low enough state beliefs µ.
Finally, the monotonicity of the crisis correspondence C follows directly from the
fact that ᾱp,µ increases in p and κp,µ strictly decreases in p for each µ ∈ (12 , 1]. To
see that p̄ < 1, observe that given any p, κp,µ strictly increases in µ, and κp,µ ≤ 12 for
µ ≤ 1
2
(1 + p); moreover, αp,µ >
1
2
given any beliefs (p, µ). Given a large enough p, the
gambling cutoff µ∗(p) is close to 1
2
such that κp,µ =
1
2
at some µ > µ∗(p) and ᾱp,µ = 1
for every µ ≥ µ∗(p).
1.6.7 Proof of Proposition 1.5
In equilibrium, given that the uninformed expert’s strategy is Markov in the public
beliefs in each arrival, the informed expert’s continuation payoff at the end of an
arrival resulting in reputation p is characterized by the recursive equation












+ (1− µl)(1− ᾱp,µl)V I
(
p





Clearly, by definition, V I(0; ᾱ) = 0. I argue that V I is strictly increasing. It is
useful to observe that by construction of ᾱp,µl in the proof of Proposition 1.1, the two





p+ (1− p)(1− ᾱp,µl)
,
are increasing in p.
Let B([0, 1]) be the set of bounded functions f : [0, 1] → R+ equipped with the
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+ (1− µl)(1− ᾱp,µl)f
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I show that V I is well-defined as the unique fixed point of T I , which is a contrac-
tion mapping. I verify Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction, namely
monotonicity and discounting. Monotonicity follows immediately since, given f and
f̂ such that f ≤ f̂ , T If ≤ T I f̂ . Discounting follows since, given any φ > 0,
T I ◦ (φ+ f(p)) < T I ◦ f(p) + φ.
Next, let B′([0, 1]) be the set of bounded and increasing functions on [0, 1], and
let B′′([0, 1]) be the set of bounded and strictly increasing functions on [0, 1]. Since
B′([0, 1]) is a closed subset of B([0, 1]), to prove that V I is strictly increasing, it
suffices to show that T I(B′([0, 1])) ⊆ B′′([0, 1]) by a standard property of contraction
mappings (see, e.g., Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, 1989, p. 52, Corollary 1). The latter
follows because f is increasing, p/(p + (1 − p)ᾱp,l) and p/(p + (1 − p)(1 − ᾱp,l)) are
increasing in p for each µl, and
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+1)l w(ᾱp,µl ; p, µl) dl
is strictly increasing in p.
1.6.8 Proof of Proposition 1.6
Let PI denote the probability measure over the set of outcomes of the game induced
in the equilibrium by conditioning on an informed type. Conditional on the expert
being an informed type, given any play history at which a principal arrives with beliefs
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p+ (1− p)(1− ᾱp,µ)
> p.
Thus (pt)t≥0 is increasing. Now, fix an arbitrary play history and a sequence of arrival
times (ti)
∞
i=0. Given any arrival time ti, for every η > 0, there exists another arrival
time ti′ , where i
′− i is sufficiently large, such that, PI [pti = pti′ ] < η. This is because
for pti = pti′ , it must hold that in all arrivals in between ti and ti′ , the agreeing states
must be correct and the time-lapses are sufficiently small such that the uninformed
type agrees with probability one. This event happens with negligible probability if
i′ − i is large. Thus, for every ε > 0, there exist T > 0 and n̄ > 0 such that for every
t ≥
¯
T and for every n ≥ n̄,




PI [pt = pt+T , T ≥
¯





PI [pt = pt+T , T ≥
¯
T ] = PI [pt = pt+T , T ≥
¯
T,Nt < n] + P
I [pt = pt+T , T ≥
¯
T,Nt ≥ n]
< P[Nt < n] + P











PI [pt < pt+T , T ≥
¯
T ] = 1−PI [pt = pt+T , T ≥
¯
T ] ≥ 1− ε.
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1.6.9 Proof of Proposition 1.7
Let PI denote the probability measure over the set of outcomes of the game induced
in the equilibrium by conditioning on an informed type. Fix p̄ such that for every
p ≥ p̄, C(p) = {1}. By Proposition 1.7, for every ε > 0, there exist T > 0 and n̄ > 0
such that for every t ≥ T and for every n ≥ n̄,









PI [qt ∈ C(pt), t ≥ T ] < PI [pt < p̄, t ≥ T ]
= PI [pt < p̄, t ≥ T,Nt < n] + PI [pt < p̄, t ≥ T,Nt ≥ n]
< PI [Nt < n] + P








1.6.10 Proof of Proposition 1.8
Let PU denote the probability measure over the set of outcomes of the game induced in
the equilibrium by conditioning on an uninformed type. Because (Nt)t≥0 is a Poisson
process with unit intensity and because the uninformed expert sends an incorrect
message in each arrival with positive probability (except in the zero-probability event
that the state belief is one in the arrival), given ε > 0, there exist T > 0 and n̄ > 0
such that for every t ≥ T and for every n ≥ n̄,










PU [pt > 0, t ≥ T ] =PU [pt > 0, t ≥ T,Nt < n] + PU [pt > 0, t ≥ T,Nt ≥ n]
<PU [Nt < n] + +P








1.6.11 Proof of Proposition 1.9
Fix ε > 0. Let PI denote the probability measure over the set of outcomes of the
game induced in the equilibrium by conditioning on an informed type. By definition,
λ(p0) < P
I [qt ∈ C(pt), t ≥ 0]. Thus, it suffices to show that there exists
¯
γ ≡
γ̄(p0, r, ε), γ̄ ≡ γ̄(p0, r, ε), where 0 <
¯
γ < γ̄ <∞ such that for each γ /∈ (
¯
γ, γ̄), in the
equilibrium,
PI [qt ∈ C(pt), t ≥ 0] < ε.
By Proposition 1.7, there exists T ≥ 0 such that




Fix such T . By Proposition 1.4 and that pt ≥ p0 for any t ≥ 0 conditional on the
expert being informed,




l(γ) := min{l > 0 : µl ∈ C(p0)} and l̄(γ) := max{l > 0 : µl ∈ C(p0)}. By
definition of C in Proposition 1.4,
¯




∞, as γ → 0,
0, as γ →∞.
Then,






0, as γ → 0,




γ, γ̄ such that for every γ /∈ (
¯
γ, γ̄), in the equilibrium,
























where the second last line follows from (1.13), and the last line follows from the
property of Poisson process (with unit intensity) that the expected number of arrivals
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up to time T is plainly T . Thus,












A group of tourists contemplates whether to stay at a particular hotel. They are
unsure whether the hotel is capable of providing high quality. Moreover, even if the
hotel is capable of providing high quality, they are unsure whether it will exert costly
effort to do so. The resulting adverse selection and moral hazard limit the tourists’
willingness to pay the hotel. The hotel, in response, pays Intertek to certify its quality
provisions. Intertek monitors the hotel’s quality provisions over time, and periodically
updates the hotel’s certification status. At any time, the hotel is either certified or
not certified, and might also receive “the Best Overall Hotel Award” from Intertek if
it has consistently delivered high quality.1
Third-party certification of firms, like in the Intertek example, is pervasive in many
markets. The example makes clear that a key role of firm certification is to address
adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard problems. For instance, when explaining
why firms should consider signing up for its certification service, Intertek writes: “We
can strengthen your brand by ensuring consistency of quality, standards and risk
1. See, for instance, “Intertek Cristal Announces Winners of 2020 Cristal Global Awards for
Outstanding Performance in the Travel & Tourism Industry,” Intertek, November 09, 2020.
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management in all things you do...”2 Similarly, the ISO 9001 certification website
writes: “Using ISO 9001 helps ensure that customers get consistent, good-quality
products and services, which in turn brings many business benefits.”3
“Honors” certification schemes as in the Intertek example, which either certify or
do not certify participating firms, and occasionally provide public awards to highlight
the top-performing firms, are common. It is also common that certification interme-
diaries award the honors implicitly by promoting the top-performing firms on their
websites or press releases, instead of providing explicit awards. The honors certifi-
cation structure, however, largely censors participating firms’ evolving track records,
and may therefore destroy the firms’ incentives to exert costly effort to provide high
quality. It thus appears to conflict with the goal to address dynamic moral hazard.
At the same time, many certification schemes allegedly feature low certification
standards. While a certified firm is generally perceived as a firm that can be relied
upon to provide high quality, the report “The False Promise of Certification” by the
NGO Changing Markets Foundation (Brad, Delemare, Hurley, Lenikus, Mulrenan,
Nemes, Trunk, and Urbancic, 2018) argues otherwise by documenting that many firms
get certified simply by participating in a scheme. Low standards limit the schemes’
effectiveness to inform consumers about firms’ ability to provide high quality. In
turn, low standards might disrupt participating firms’ incentives to exert costly effort
to provide high quality, limiting the role of certification to address dynamic moral
hazard. Low standards also appear to be be at odds with the role of certification to
address adverse selection.
If the two common properties of firm certification, namely an honors certification
structure and a low certification standard, limit the value of certification in alleviating
2. See https://cristalstandards.com/ (accessed on February 16, 2021).
3. See https://www.iso.org/iso-9001-quality-management.html (accessed on February 16,
2021).
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information asymmetries and in turn the certifiers’ revenue, why are they common?
To address this question, I develop a certification model featuring both adverse
selection and dynamic moral hazard in a firm’s quality provision. A firm (she) trades
with a succession of consumers over time. The firm privately knows her type (either
competent or inept) and her effort towards quality provision, and is tempted to shirk
against consumers. The firm may pay a certifier upfront to participate in a certifica-
tion scheme. The scheme repeatedly rates the firm given her track record. Ratings
link the firm’s past behavior to market expectations of her future behavior, affecting
her future revenue. The certifier chooses a scheme ex ante to maximize his revenue.
I characterize schemes that allow the certifier to extract the full net market sur-
plus, which I call full-surplus-optimal (FSO) schemes. These schemes must attract
participation by both competent and inept firms. They must display “coarse” ratings
that censor a firm’s track record, as well as “transfer” ratings that transfer some
positive surpluses produced by a competent firm to an inept firm. I show that FSO
schemes can be implemented with an honors certification structure and a lower certifi-
cation standard: in each period, a participating firm receives one of the three ratings,
namely “not certified,” “certified,” or “certified with honors,” depending on the firm’s
track record; moreover, the standard is low in the sense an inept firm is frequently
certified. The “certified” rating is a transfer rating.
Low-standard, honors certification schemes convey a limited amount of informa-
tion regarding a firm’s type and evolving track record to consumers. The competent
firm then faces persistent reputational incentives to exert high effort in order to sepa-
rate from an inept type, generating the maximum surplus in each period. As a result,
the scheme maximizes social welfare. Moreover, by certifying the inept firm, the
certifier transfers some surpluses that are produced by the competent firm from the
competent firm to the inept firm. The certifier then extracts the resulting surpluses
from both types, which sum to the full net market surplus.
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My construction of FSO schemes contains novel elements. In my model, the folk
theorem does not hold. Thus, schemes such as those based on review strategies (e.g.,
Radner, 1985; Varas, Marinovic, and Skrzypacz, forthcoming) are in general not FSO
even in the limit of no discounting. Under a review strategy, the certifier divides
the horizon into review phases and rates the firm at the end of each phase given
the realized quality provisions. A short review phase cannot motivate high effort
by a competent firm when the effort cost is high, as it fails to sufficiently separate a
competent firm from an inept one. A longer review phase inevitably leads to shirking,
since a firm that has produced several bad outcomes expects to fail the review and
thus shirks for the remainder of the phase. The punishment phase upon failing a
review might also call for further shirking. The probability of shirking does not
vanish for large discount factors.
The features of low certification standard and the censoring of track records have
attracted ample concerns about the ability of certification schemes to alleviate in-
formation asymmetries in experience-good and credence-good markets,4 in environ-
mental certifications,5 and in financial markets.6 These features have also attracted
considerable attention in the academic literature of certification. Existing certifica-
tion models (e.g., Lizzeri, 1999; Stahl and Strausz, 2017; Harbaugh and Rasmusen,
2018; Hopenhayn and Saeedi, 2019) are often cast in a static, pure adverse-selection
setting,7 focusing on certifying the quality of finished products and abstracting from
4. For example, see “Grading New York Restaurants: What’s in an ‘A’?” The New York Times,
January 19, 2011.
5. For instance, Changing Market Foundation calls on schemes in different industries to be more
transparent and more selective about who to certify (Brad et al., 2018).
6. Many regulators criticize that corporate credit ratings are too coarse to accurately inform the
public about the firms’ ability to meet their debt obligations (see, e.g., Partnoy, 2006; Pagano and
Volpin, 2010; Partnoy, 2017). In turn, they might fail to discipline firms to avoid excessive risk-taking
and to manage their investments diligently.
7. Some models have an ex ante moral-hazard stage where the product quality is chosen (e.g.,
Albano and Lizzeri, 2001; Zapechelnyuk, 2020) but abstract from dynamic moral hazard considera-
tions.
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the role of certification in incentivizing dynamic quality provisions. This role is key
to certifying firms, as opposed to finished products, in applications: quality certi-
fications incentivize hotels, restaurants, and other experience-good firms to put in
costly effort to best serve consumers; eco-labels incentivize firms to continually invest
in new environmental technologies (e.g., OECD, 1997; Goodland, 2002); corporate
credit ratings discipline firms to continually manage their investments diligently.
To the best of my knowledge, my model provides the first analysis of certification
that features both adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard, and delivers new
insights concerning the popularity of low certification standards and honors certifica-
tion structures. The important insight from existing pure adverse-selection models is
that, these features maximize participation by firms and thus the certifiers’ revenue.8
But as the opening paragraphs motivate, when the dynamic moral hazard problem is
present, these properties might backfire, disrupting firms’ incentives to provide high
quality and in turn destroying the certifiers’ revenue. My analysis thus elucidates
how a profit-maximizing certifier trades off screening and incentives to provide high
quality.9 Moreover, contrary to the pure adverse-selection models, simply attracting
participation by inept firms does not suffice for the certifier’s profit maximization.
Specifically, in my model, the certifier must employ transfer ratings upon attract-
ing participation by inept firms and induce high effort by competent firms at these
ratings to maximize his profit.
My results also contribute to the literature on repeated games. My model builds
on a classic firm-reputation game; see, e.g., Mailath and Samuelson (2001), Hörner
8. In particular, firms participate in certification to signal their quality. In this regard, the liter-
ature that studies endogeneous entry into markets by firms who face reputational incentives is also
related (see, e.g., Atkeson, Hellwig, and Ordoñez, 2015; Vellodi, 2019).
9. To focus on how low-standard, honors certification addresses adverse selection and dynamic
moral hazard, my analysis abstracts from other important reasons for censoring information, such
as biased certifiers or difficulty to interpret exact information by consumers, that are examined in
the certification literature. See also Dranove and Jin (2010) for a survey.
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(2002), and also Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) for a survey. As discussed above,
the folk theorem does not hold, and schemes with familiar structures such as those
based on review strategies are in general not FSO. Much difficulty in constructing
FSO schemes in my model stems from the absence of a Stackelberg type of firm
who always exerts high effort. In FSO schemes, “top” ratings must give a firm high
profits to motivate her to exert high effort at lower ratings. When a Stackelberg
type is present, top ratings give a firm high profits by allowing her to shirk while
consumers’ payments remain high (e.g., Ekmekci, 2011). In my model, the absence
of a Stackelberg type rules out such possibility and yields a new trade-off between
rating transparency and efficiency. Top ratings induce high payments in equilibrium
only if, at these ratings, consumers believe that the firm is likely competent and the
firm exerts high effort. The FSO schemes must therefore be sufficiently transparent
for consumers to learn. However, they cannot be too transparent: to motivate high
effort at top ratings, a firm that performs badly must be punished with low ratings
that induce low payments. Given consistent high effort, low payments can be induced
only if consumers are unsure of the firms type.
More broadly, the complementarity between adverse selection and moral hazard
has been highlighted extensively in the literatures of information design and limited
records for dynamic incentive provision (e.g., Lizzeri, Meyer, and Persico, 2002; Liu,
2011; Ekmekci, 2011; Liu and Skrzypacz, 2014; Che and Hörner, 2018; Kovbasyuk and
Spagnolo, 2018; Bhaskar and Thomas, 2019; Hörner and Lambert, 2020; Lorecchio
and Monte, 2021).10 The goal to rationalize low-standard honors scheme, as well as
the certifier’s profit-maximizing motive, contrast with these literatures. My analysis
also highlights the role of transfer ratings in maximizing the certifier’s profits. In
particular, as illustrated in Section 2.5, these transfer ratings constrain the certifier’s
10. Relatedly, Marinovic, Skrzypacz, and Varas (2018) take a certification technology as exoge-
nously given and study a firm’s investment behavior.
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ability to provide incentives for quality provision.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 The Market
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. A long-lived firm (she) faces a sequence
of short-lived consumers (it). A certifier (he) designs and sells a certification scheme.
The horizon is divided into two stages. In the first stage, the certifier offers the
firm a (certification) scheme, defined below in Definition 2.1.11 The firm privately
learns her type θ, which is competent (C) with probability µ ∈ (0, 1) and is inept (I)
otherwise.12 The firm observes the scheme, and either accepts or rejects the scheme
in that stage. Upon acceptance, the firm reports a type to the certifier and pays a
certification fee, which may depend on her report as specified by the scheme. Upon
rejection, without loss of generality,13 the firm receives a null rating ∅ forever. The
firm can mix over her participation decisions d ∈ {C, I,∅}, where d = θ refers to
acceptance with a report θ, and d = ∅ stands for rejection (identified with the null
rating). Let π(d|θ) denote the probability that a firm chooses decision d given her
type θ. This ends the first stage. Observe that, for ease of exposition, I have modeled
the scheme as a direct mechanism. The certifier can equivalently offer the firm a
menu of schemes, each intended for a type, and charge the firm a fee tailored for each
11. Because the scheme is chosen once and for all, an interpretation is that the certifier commits
to the scheme. Commitment may arise from his reputational concerns (Coffee, 1997). A famous
example of a certifier’s desire to signal such commitment is the expulsion by Better Business Bureaus
of its Los Angeles affiliate in 2009, after several eateries ware discovered to pay for high ratings. See
“Better Business Bureau Expels Los Angeles Area Chapter,” Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2013.
12. Footnote 26 discusses how the results extend when there are more than two types.
13. As Section 2.2.4 explains, this assumption gives the firm the lowest possible equilibrium payoff
upon rejection in the constructions in later sections. If the certifier were able to rate a firm who
rejected the scheme, giving the firm a null rating if and only if a firm rejected would be optimal,
since this minimizes the firms rejection payoff.
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scheme.14
The scheme, alongside the firm’s participation decision, induces a repeated game
in the second stage. In this stage, with periods t = 0, 1, . . . , the firm interacts with
the consumers. At the beginning of each period, the firm’s rating is updated before a
new consumer enters. The consumer pays the firm its expected payoff from the trade
outcome upfront. The firm then chooses effort, which generates a noisy outcome.
















Figure 2.1: Timing of moves in each period t = 0, 1, . . .
There is a unit continuum of effort levels. A competent firm chooses effort from
the continuum. An inept firm can only exert zero effort. Effort level e yields a good
outcome ȳ with probability e(1−ρ)+(1−e)ρ and a bad outcome
¯
y with complementary
probability, where ρ ∈ (0, 1
2
).15 Thus, higher effort is more likely to lead to a good
outcome.16
Consumers receive a payoff of 1 from a good outcome and a payoff of 0 from a
bad outcome. A firm’s profit in each period equals a consumer’s payment minus her
effort cost. An effort level e costs the firm ce, where c > 0. I assume that high
effort, i.e., effort 1, is efficient, so that e = 1 maximizes the expected stage surplus
e(1 − ρ − c) + (1 − e)ρ. In turn, this implies that the social surplus associated with
14. In practice, it is often the case that certifiers set fees with two components—one that is
common to all participating firms, and the other one that depends on the individual participating
firms’ characteristics such as the firms’ sizes and operational structures.
15. The assumption that the probability ρ is independent of effort e is for notational convenience.
16. The results extend when there are more outcomes associated with the effort levels, so long
as each consumer’s expected payoff given high effort is 1 − ρ and that given zero effort is ρ. As
will be evident, ratings in the constructions that follow plainly induce payments that are linear
combinations of the expected payoff given high effort and that given zero effort.
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high effort exceeds that with zero effort:
1− ρ− c > ρ. (2.1)
In an induced game, the time, the scheme and the participation rule are commonly
known. The firm’s type and effort choices are her private information. The firm
observes the rating and outcome in each period. Each consumer sees the current
rating and a finite number K of most recent past ratings.17
I now define a (certification) scheme.
Definition 2.1. A certification scheme is a pair (f, S), where
f : {C, I,∅} → R+
defines a fee given a firm’s participation decision, and S = (St)
∞
t=0 is a rating system
where each
St : {C, I,∅} ×Rt × {ȳ,
¯
y}t → ∆(R)
maps the firm’s participation decision and her previous ratings and outcomes up to
and including time t − 1 to a distribution over a set of ratings R, from which the
period-t rating is drawn. The mapping f has the restriction that f(∅) = 0, and the
mapping S has the restriction that St(∅, ·) = 1 ◦ {∅} for each period t.
The fees and the system (in particular, the range R) are freely chosen by the
certifier. The restriction f(∅) = 0 says that rejection is free. The restriction
17. Finite past rating observations capture the feature of limited records that are prominent
in practice. I show in Section 2.9 that if consumers observe infinitely many past ratings, then
FSO schemes, as I formally define in Definition 2.2, fail to exist, not even virtually in the sense
defined in Section 2.5. Moreover, it does not matter whether consumers also observe outcomes. One
interpretation is that consumers observe their outcomes and report to the certifier before exiting.
Another interpretation is that the firm sells a credence good; consumers do not observe the outcomes
but the certifier possesses the expertise to do so.
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St(∅, ·) = 1 ◦ {∅} for each period t says that the system displays a null rating
in each period upon a firm’s rejection. Let G(f, S, d) denote a game induced by a
scheme (f, S) and a decision d ∈ {C, I,∅}.
I next describe strategies, payoffs and equilibrium in an induced game in the
second stage. I then define the certifier’s problem in the first stage. Finally, I discuss
my modeling choices.
2.2.2 Induced Game
Consider an induced game G(f, S, d) in the second stage. This is a repeated game
with incomplete information that unfolds as described in Section 2.2.1. Given a
prior belief µ that the firm is competent, a current rating r and K recent past ratings
qK := (r−K , . . . , r−1), where r−k denotes the rating published k periods ago, a period-t
consumer forms a belief that the firm is competent via Bayes’ rule given its knowledge
of the scheme (f, S) and the participation rule π. This belief, denoted by ϕt(q
K , r),
is interpreted as the firm’s reputation.
Let Ht := (R × [0, 1] × {ȳ,
¯
y})t × R be the set of the firm’s histories in period t
before she chooses effort, consisting of previous ratings, efforts and outcomes up to
and including period t− 1 and the period-t rating. The firm’s strategy is a collection
σd = (σdt )
∞
t=0, where each
σdt : Ht × {C, I} → [0, 1]
specifies an effort level in period t after each firm’s history ht ∈ Ht given her type θ,
with the restriction that σdt (·, I) = 0. When there is no risk of ambiguity, I write the
competent firm’s strategy σdt (·, C) simply as σdt (·). The strategy σd induces a prob-
ability measure P dθ over the set of infinite histories in the induced game, conditional
on the firm’s type θ.
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A consumer’s payment, which is its expected payoff from an outcome, depends on
its belief on the firm’s type and on the competent firm’s effort. Specifically, a period-t
consumer who observes a current rating r and the K recent past ratings qK pays the
firm
pt(q




C [σdt (ht)|qK , r]
∣∣qK , r]. (2.2)
The conditional expectations Eπ[·|qK , r] and EP dC [·|qK , r] capture that given ratings
(qK , r), a consumer forms beliefs on the firm’s participation decision (and hence the
induced game being played) given the participation rule, and on the competent firm’s
histories (which determine her effort) given her strategy. Given the payoff normaliza-
tion on outcomes (payoff of 1 from a good outcome and 0 from a bad outcome), the
payment is plainly the consumer’s belief of receiving a good outcome.






K , r)− cet)
]
, (2.3)
where et denotes the effort level chosen in period t.
The solution concept that I use is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Mas-Colell,
Whinston, and Green, 1995, p. 285). In such an equilibrium, denoted by (σd, ϕ), σd
is maximizing after each history of the firm of each type given consumers’ beliefs ϕ =
(ϕt)
∞
t=0, and the beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule given σ
d whenever possible.18
Observe that the sole role of each rating is to influence a consumer’s belief of
receiving a good outcome and, in turn, the payment as given by (2.2). Hence, one
can, without loss, take the set of non-null ratings to be the set of beliefs. Hereafter,
18. An equilibrium exists, in which the competent firm always exerts zero effort. In this equi-
librium, on path, each consumer pays the firm ρ irrespective of the realized rating, according to
(2.2).
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I assume that R = [0, 1] ∪ {∅}.
Finally, in an induced game upon rejection, a competent firm optimally exerts
zero effort as null ratings convey no information regarding her past play to consumers.
Thus, if a scheme displays a null rating with zero probability upon a firm’s acceptance,
then, in equilibrium, each consumer who sees a null rating infers that the firm has
rejected the scheme. This means that, upon seeing a null rating, the consumer expects
zero effort and pays the firm ρ, according to (2.2), irrespective of its belief on the
firm’s type.
2.2.3 The Certifier’s Problem
To formulate the certifier’s problem in the first stage, I allow the certifier to not only
choose a scheme but also a participation rule for the firm, subject to constraints that
the firm optimally follows the rule given the scheme and some collection of equilibria,
one in each of the three induced games.19 I denote a collection of equilibria by
(σ, ϕ) := {(σd, ϕ)}d∈{C,I,∅}. Moreover, by the revelation principle, I assume without
loss that the certifier chooses a scheme and a participation rule to incentivize truthful
reporting by a firm upon acceptance at the optimum.
Given a scheme (f, S), a participation rule π, a decision d, and an equilibrium
(σd, ϕ) in the induced game, define




K , r)− cet)
]
− f(d) (2.4)
as a type-θ firm’s payoff, that is, her profits from the interaction with consumers
19. That is, the certifier picks his preferred participation rule and collection of equilibria. This
aligns with the mechanism design literature in which the principal picks his favorite equilibrium. An
alternative formulation of the certifier’s problem could be that he faces his “worst-case” collection
of equilibria as in the robust mechanism design literature. The solution to such problem is trivial in
my setting, as the worst-case collection of equilibria calls for consistent zero effort by the competent
firm and the certifier obtains zero payoff.
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minus the fee payment to the certifier. Then the certifier’s problem is as follows. The
certifier chooses a scheme (f, S) and a participation rule π to maximize his expected
payoff
µπ(C|C)f(C) + (1− µ)π(I|I)f(I), (2.5)
subject to incentive compatibility that each type-θ firm truthfully reports upon ac-
ceptance:
U(θ, σθ; θ) ≥ U(θ′, σθ′ ; θ), θ′ 6= θ,
as well as individual rationality that each type-θ firm follows the participation rule:
π(d|θ) ≥ π(d′|θ) =⇒ U(d, σd; θ) ≥ U(d′, σd′ ; θ),
in some collection of equilibria (σ, ϕ).20
2.2.4 Discussion of Modeling Choices
In the model, adverse selection arises as the firm’s type is her private information.
Moral hazard arises as the competent firm faces a myopic temptation to shirk against
consumers. Absent a scheme, the competent firm optimally exerts zero effort, as
consumers do not observe any past play. The firm’s equilibrium payoff is then ρ.
The firm would obtain higher profits if she could convince consumers that she is
competent and that she will exert high effort. By adequately revealing information
to consumers, schemes may act as a screening device to address adverse selection and
as a commitment device to address moral hazard. Expression (2.2) highlights the role
20. I show that a solution to the certifier’s problem exists by construction for the parameter values
under consideration in later sections.
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ratings play in coordinating consumers’ beliefs of the firm’s type and effort.
I pause for a brief discussion of my modeling choices. First, I have assumed that
consumers pay their expected payoffs. This captures the competitive demand for the
firm’s service and is familiar from existing reputation models.21
Second, observe that by definition, I allow a scheme to display a null rating upon a
firm’s acceptance. For example, in the Intertek example, the null rating is interpreted
as “not certified.” Upon seeing (only) the null rating, consumers are unsure whether
the firm did not sign up for certification or she signed up but failed to be certified.
Third, the fee in my model captures the source of a certifier’s revenue and is
familiar from the certification literature. In practice, the monetary transfer from a
firm to a certifier often involves a stream of payments that are fixed ex ante. The fee
in my model can without loss be interpreted as a discounted sum of a stream of these
payments. While output-contingent fees are theoretically attractive, they are ruled
out in my model, as is often the case in practice.
Finally, note also that even if the firm had the choice to terminate the relation-
ship with the certifier in each period, she would have no strict incentive to do so in
equilibrium, as continuing allows her to be at least as well off.
2.3 Full-Surplus Optimality
My analysis focuses on full-surplus-optimal (FSO) schemes, which are schemes that
allow the certifier to seize the full net market surplus. In this section, I formally define
an FSO scheme. I derive properties of the payoffs and behavior of both types of firms
in games induced by any FSO scheme, as well as properties of any FSO scheme, when
an FSO scheme exists. This section is, however, silent on when such a scheme exists.
Instead, the properties help to motivate the constructions of FSO schemes in later
21. See, e.g., Holmström (1999), Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Board and Meyer-ter Vehn
(2013).
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sections. Proofs are in Section 2.10.
To define full-surplus optimality, I first derive the certifier’s payoff when he ex-
tracts the full net market surplus, i.e., an upper bound on his payoff. Ex ante, the
probability of a firm being competent (resp., inept) in any period is µ (resp., 1− µ),
by the martingale property of beliefs. If a firm is competent (resp., inept), then the
maximum market surplus is 1 − ρ − c (resp., ρ). A firm’s payoff upon rejection is
at least ρ, which is the lower bound on her equilibrium payoff and is guaranteed by
a firm who rejects and then always exerts zero effort. The certifier’s payoff when he
extracts the full net market surplus is therefore
W̄ := µ(1− ρ− c− ρ) + (1− µ)(ρ− ρ) = µ(1− 2ρ− c). (2.6)
Definition 2.2. A scheme (f, S) is FSO if the certifier attains the payoff W̄ in
the certifier’s problem by using this scheme given some participation rule and some
collection of equilibria.
Fix an FSO scheme (f, S), and its associated participation rule π and collection
of equilibria. The derivation of W̄ in (2.6) reveals several key properties of the
participation rule, the scheme and the collection of equilibria. First, the collection
of equilibria must be efficient, namely, that the competent firm exerts high effort
consistently (i.e., after every history that occurs with positive probability) in every
induced game G(f, S, d) in which she plays with positive probability, that is, π(d|C) >
0. This ensures that the competent firm produces the maximum surplus 1 − ρ − c
upon acceptance. Efficiency implies that FSO schemes make a firm as valuable to
consumers as she can be. Moreover, FSO schemes maximize social surplus because
consumers pay the firm their expected payoffs, and the firm’s payment to the certifier
is simply a transfer.
The second property is that the participation rule satisfies full competence accep-
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tance, i.e., π(C|C) = 1. (Truthful reporting follows from incentive compatibility.)
This ensures that the certifier extracts the competent type’s surplus with probability
one. Indeed, efficiency requires full competent acceptance: if a competent firm re-
jects with positive probability, then she optimally exerts zero effort in the game upon
rejection (Section 2.2.2), disrupting efficiency.
These two properties imply that positive inept acceptance, namely, π(I|I) > 0, is
necessary, although only the competent type can produce a positive net surplus for
the certifier by (2.6). Suppose on the contrary that the participation rule specifies
that only the competent firm accepts. If the certifier’s payoff equals W̄ , the competent
firm must then receive a payment 1−ρ in each period upon acceptance. But then she
would deviate to exert zero effort and save the cost after each history upon acceptance
(and truthfully reporting), disrupting efficiency.22
Moreover, the collection of equilibria satisfies full extraction, i.e., a firm’s payoff
(2.4) equals ρ independent of her type θ given any participation decision d she chooses
with positive probability, that is, π(d|θ) > 0. This ensures that the certifier seizes all
the available net surplus in the market.
Given a participation rule and a collection of equilibria, I say that a scheme
has a low certification standard if the rating system displays a rating that does not
fully reveal to a consumer the firm’s type with positive probability upon a firm’s
acceptance; a scheme is coarse if there is a rating that is displayed with positive
probability upon a firm’s acceptance and does not fully reveal to a consumer the
entire history of outcomes.
Any FSO scheme must have a low certification standard and must be coarse. Ab-
22. An inept firm need not accept with probability one given an FSO scheme. On the one hand,
if an inept type accepts with a higher probability, the certifier extracts revenues from the inept
firm with a higher probability. Yet, a higher inept firm’s acceptance probability lowers consumers’
beliefs that a firm is competent and in turn the revenues that can be extracted by the certifier. The
derivation of (2.6) shows that these two countervailing forces on the certifier’s payoff balance out.
Footnote 23 identifies an explicit construction where an inept firm mixes in her acceptance given an
FSO scheme.
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sent a low standard, ratings upon a competent report fully reveal that the firm is
competent. Given efficiency, payments always equal 1− ρ by (2.2), again disrupting
the firm’s incentives for high effort upon acceptance. If a scheme has a low stan-
dard but is not coarse, then there is a history after which a competent firm, who
has accepted the scheme and consistently exerted high effort in the past, optimally
deviates to exert zero effort, as consumers’ beliefs (and thus payments by (2.2)) are
then virtually identical irrespective of future outcomes. This again disrupts efficiency.
I collect these observations in Lemma 2.1 below, together with a converse result
and a condition on the parameters that is necessary for efficiency.
Lemma 2.1. If a scheme is FSO given a participation rule and a collection of equi-
libria, then the participation rule satisfies full competence acceptance and positive
inept acceptance, and the collection of equilibria satisfies efficiency and full extrac-
tion. Moreover, the scheme must have a low certification standard and must be coarse.
Conversely, if a scheme and a participation rule solve the certifier’s problem given a
collection of equilibria that satisfies efficiency and full extraction, then the scheme is
FSO. Finally, an efficient collection of equilibria exists only if
c < c̄ ≡ c̄(µ, ρ) := δ(1− 2ρ)2. (2.7)
Condition (2.7) can be interpreted as follows. Given that the effort cost is linear in
the effort level, to motivate consistent high effort, the effort cost must be smaller than
the largest difference between the discounted expected benefit of high effort versus
















This largest difference is such that, upon a good (resp., bad) outcome, which is more
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likely conditional on high (resp., low) effort, the competent firm achieves the largest
positive (resp., negative) difference in payments. The above inequality then follows
because payments, given by (2.2), are bounded above by 1− ρ and below by ρ. The
lower bound is strict since payments strictly exceed ρ given efficiency.
Condition (2.7) refines the static efficiency condition (2.1). When a competent
firm exerts high effort in an induced game, she incurs the cost immediately. However,
she captures the benefit of high effort, namely higher continuation profits upon a
good outcome relative to a bad outcome, only partially. This is because future profits
are discounted and the competent firm may unluckily produce a bad outcome despite
having exerted high effort, thereby failing to capture higher continuation profits.
Lemma 2.1 holds for any discount factor. One might conjecture that as the dis-
count factor tends to 1, the certifier’s optimal payoff tends to W̄ even if the inept type
rejects for sure. This is not true. Indeed, if the participation rule specifies that the
inept firm rejects with probability one, then ratings at best induce frequent (but not
consistent) high effort by the competent firm upon her acceptance, and the certifier’s
optimal payoff falls short of W̄ . That is, the folk theorem does not hold: to incentivize
high effort, the competent firm must face low continuations with positive probability.
Since consumers are short-lived and pay the firm their expected payoffs, low continu-
ations necessarily require a competent firm to shirk and induce low payments. These
low continuations do not vanish in the patient limit.
Low certification standard and efficiency together imply that any FSO scheme
must transfer some surpluses from competent to inept firms via some ratings that I
call “transfer” ratings. As the preceding discussion makes clear, any positive surplus
collected by the certifier is produced by the competent firm. Lemma 2.1 also shows
that the certifier can never achieve the payoff W̄ by extracting surplus only from the
competent type. As the constructions in later sections explicitly illustrate, to fully
extract the net market surplus, the certifier must rely on these transfer ratings to
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motivate the competent firm to exert high effort and then to transfer some surpluses
produced by a competent firm to an inept firm and then extract positive net surpluses
from both types, which sum to the full net surplus.
2.4 Honors Certification: Low Effort Costs
I now turn to construct FSO schemes. By Lemma 2.1, for fixed (µ, ρ, δ), I restrict
attention to effort costs c < c̄, where c̄ is defined in (2.7). Moreover, in this section,
I further restrict attention to smaller effort costs





< c̄ = δ(1− 2ρ)2. (2.8)
The case of higher effort costs is analyzed in Section 2.5.
Condition (2.8) allows me to construct a simple FSO scheme with a stationary
Markov system that displays only two non-null ratings, denoted by r0 and r1, upon
a firm’s acceptance, highlighting the key insights of my model. I say that a system
is stationary if the payment pt(q
K , r) induced by a consumer’s observation of past
and current ratings (qK , r) displayed by the system is independent of time t, and it
is Markov if each map St of the system depends only on the most recent rating and
the most recent outcome. Given a stationary Markov rating system, I say that the
associated scheme and ratings are stationary Markov. As will be seen in Section 2.5,
a more involved rating structure is required for full-surplus optimality in the case of
higher effort costs.
To ease the exposition, I further assume here that each consumer observes only
the current rating but not the past ratings, i.e. K = 0. The main ideas in this section
readily extend to the case of K > 0, where consumers observe a positive number of
past ratings. In this case, the range of costs over which the scheme constructed in
this section is FSO is smaller. The case of K > 0 is relegated to Section 2.7 as it
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complicates the exposition. To be sure, even if consumers observe only the current
ratings, schemes are defined to be flexible enough to disclose as much information
via a current rating as one might wish, including all previous outcomes, ratings and
participation decision.
My first main result is:
Proposition 2.1. Fix (µ, ρ, δ) and K = 0. There exists a stationary Markov scheme
(f2, S2) that is FSO for any c ≤ c̄2.
In the remainder of this section, I first present the construction. Then, I interpret
the constructed scheme as a “low-standard, honors certification scheme.”
Because the ratings r0 and r1 are non-null, a firm’s rejection payoff is ρ, irrespective
of consumers’ off-path beliefs on the firm’s type (Section 2.2.2). Thus, consumers need
not believe that a firm who deviates to reject is inept for sure for the construction.
The system S2 operates as follows. Given a competent report, the initial rating
is r0 with probability 1 − ρ and is r1 with probability ρ. The system thereafter
displays rating r0 upon a good outcome and rating r1 upon a bad outcome. Given
an inept report, the system always displays rating r1. The fee f2, given in Section
2.8.1, keeps an accepting firm at her rejection payoff ρ for a given participation rule
and collection of equilibria, denoted by π∗ and (σ∗, ϕ∗) and described next, making
acceptance individually rational.
The participation rule π∗ specifies that a firm accepts with probability one and
reports truthfully. The collection of equilibria (σ∗, ϕ∗) calls for the competent firm
to exert high effort given each rating in the game G(f2, S2, C), and to always exert
zero effort in other induced games. Thus, the ratings r0 and r1 induce, respectively,






that the firm is competent in each period. Rating r0 separates a competent firm from
an inept firm, while rating r1 pools both types. By (2.2), there are two payments,
p(r0) = 1− ρ and p(r1) < 1− ρ. (The time subscript is omitted due to stationarity.)
By construction, the collection of equilibria satisfies full extraction and efficiency.
To verify that the scheme is FSO, it suffices to verify, first, that the competent firm
has no profitable deviation from consistent high effort in the game G(f2, S2, C) and
optimally exerts zero effort in the games G(f2, S2, I) and G(f2, S2,∅), and, second,
that a firm does not profit by deviating to misreport her type upon acceptance.
Clearly, the competent firm optimally always exerts zero effort in the games
G(f2, S2, I) and G(f2, S2,∅) since the ratings do not reflect her past play in the
games. In the game G(f2, S2, C), the competent firm consistently exerts high effort
to chase the high price p(r0) and to avoid the low price p(r1). Since the firm’s cost
is linear in effort, and because the system S2 upon a competent report depends only
on the recent outcome, the incentive constraint for high effort is that the discounted
expected benefit of high effort versus zero effort in the following period outweighs the
cost incurred in the current period:
δ
[ (
(1− ρ)p(r0) + ρp(r1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payment after high effort
−
(
ρp(r0) + (1− ρ)p(r1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payment after zero effort
]
≥ c.
The inequality is equivalent to c ≤ c̄2 in (2.8).
A firm does not profit by deviating to misreport upon acceptance. Both types
obtain a payoff ρ given the participation rule and the collection of equilibria. A
competent firm who deviates to misreport as inept optimally exerts zero effort in the
game G(f2, S2, I) and earns identical profits as an inept type does. Her payoff upon
deviation remains as ρ. An inept type who misreports as competent obtains rating r0
less frequently and obtains lower profits than the competent firm does. The deviation
makes her strictly worse off, as a competent firm obtains exactly ρ after paying the
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competent fee.23
The FSO scheme can be interpreted as an honors certification scheme with a
low certification standard. The rating r0 represents “certified with honors,” and the
rating r1 represents “certified.” Given the participation rule π
∗ and the collection of
equilibria (σ∗, ϕ∗), the scheme has a low certification standard, as the inept firm is
“certified,” i.e., achieves the rating r1, with probability one. The “certified” rating
r1 is a transfer rating that the certifier relies upon to extract the full net surplus. An
inept firm receives a profit p(r1) > ρ, despite failing to produce any surplus above ρ;
a competent firm receives a profit p(r1)− c < 1− ρ− c, despite producing a surplus
1− ρ− c. Finally, the honors structure makes the scheme coarse, as the ratings only
reveal the last outcome in each period.
2.5 Honors Certification: High Effort Costs
I next turn to present my second main result that concerns full-surplus optimality
given higher effort costs. Specifically, I characterize a family of schemes given which
the certifier achieves full-surplus optimality when the firm is arbitrarily patient. More-
23. In fact, if c < c̄2, then the participation rule associated with the scheme (f2, S2) need not
specify full inept acceptance, π(I|I) = 1, for full-surplus optimality. Specifically, in the above
construction, replace the pooling rating r1 by an alternative pooling rating r
′













ρp(r0) + (1− ρ)p(r′1)
)]
≥ c (2.11)
binds. Also adjust the fee such that both types receive a payoff ρ upon acceptance and truthfully
reporting. (2.10) follows as it is now less likely that an accepting firm is inept when an inept firm
mixes between accepting and rejecting. By construction, when c = c̄2, π(I|I) = 1. As π(I|I) falls,
p(r′1) rises, weakening punishment upon a bad outcome and (2.11) holds only for smaller costs. Thus,
for any c ∈ (0, c̄2), there is a unique π(I|I) ∈ (0, 1) such that (2.11) binds, which is the lowest inept
acceptance probability that can be chosen without disrupting efficiency. By (2.11), the competent
firm optimally exerts high effort upon acceptance. The inept firm is willing to mix between accepting
and rejecting, since she receives a payoff ρ either way.
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over, I drop Condition (2.8) that c ≤ c̄2 and consider costs c < (1− 2ρ)2. The bound
(1− 2ρ)2 is c̄, defined in (2.7) when evaluated in the limit δ → 1.24
Given any ε > 0, I say that a scheme is ε-FSO if the certifier obtains a payoff of
at least W̄ − ε by using the scheme given some participation rule and some collection
of equilibria in the certifier’s problem.
Definition 2.3. A family {(fε, Sε)|ε > 0} of schemes is virtually FSO if for each




δ(µ, ρ, c,K, ε) ∈ (0, 1) such that for every δ ∈ [
¯
δ, 1), the
scheme (fε, Sε) is ε-FSO.
Given a virtually FSO family of schemes, the certifier achieves full-surplus opti-
mality when the firm is arbitrarily patient. My second main result is:
Proposition 2.2. Fix (µ, ρ, c,K) such that c < (1−2ρ)2 and K ≥ 0. Then a virtually
FSO family of schemes exists only if
c < (1− 2ρ)2 1− µ
ρ
. (2.12)
Conversely, given Condition (2.12), there exists a virtually FSO family of schemes
{(fKε , SKε )|ε > 0} in which each scheme (fKε , SKε ) is stationary Markov.
The construction of the scheme (fKε , S
K
ε ) for each ε > 0 in the proposition calls for
a large number of stationary Markov ratings. The number of such ratings decreases
in ε, and grows to infinity as ε vanishes.25 As I show in the next section, each
24. I show that patience is necessary for efficiency when the effort cost is large and close to
(1−2ρ)2 in Section 2.9. Intuitively, to achieve efficiency, punishment upon a bad outcome produced
by the competent type after any history must be sufficiently harsh. Given discounting, such harsh
punishment necessarily involves ratings that induce low enough consumers’ beliefs about the firm’s
competence and are realized soon enough after a bad outcome. But, by Bayes’ rule, these ratings
that are realized soon enough cannot induce low enough consumers’ beliefs.
25. In Section 2.9, I show that when effort cost is sufficiently large, any stationary Markov scheme
that is FSO must feature a large number of ratings. Given a stationary Markov structure, the number
of ratings restricts the extent to which consumers’ beliefs, payments and a firm’s continuation profit
upon a bad outcome can fall, and in turn restricting the range of costs over which efficiency can be
achieved in equilibrium.
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such scheme (fKε , S
K
ε ) also has an “honors certification” implementation that features
only three stationary ratings: a null rating that represents “not certified,” and two
non-null ratings that represent “certified” and “certified with honors,” upon a firm’s
acceptance; moreover, each such scheme has a low certification standard, as an inept
firm who participates is “certified” with probability close to one.
If ρ > 1 − µ, then Condition (2.12) strengthens the condition c < (1 − 2ρ)2.
Otherwise, Condition (2.12) is vacuous given c < (1 − 2ρ)2. Condition (2.12) is
interpreted as follows. For efficiency, there must be top ratings that induce high
payments to motivate a competent firm to exert high effort at lower ratings. Top
ratings induce high payments in equilibrium only if, at these ratings, the competent
firm exerts high effort. To motivate high effort at top ratings, the competent firm
who produces bad outcomes must then receive “low” ratings that induce sufficiently
low payments. Given efficiency, payments are low only if consumers are unsure of
the firm’s type. When ρ > 1 − µ so that monitoring is sufficiently noisy and the
effort cost is sufficiently large so that Condition (2.12) fails, low ratings fail to induce
sufficiently low payments.
2.5.1 A Stationary Markov Construction
I now present the construction. In the main text, I again assume that each consumer
observes only the current rating but no past ratings, i.e., K = 0, to ease the expo-
sition. The main ideas readily extend to the case of K > 0, which is relegated to
Section 2.7. At the end of Section 2.5.2, I briefly comment on why this is so.
Fix (µ, ρ, c, ε) such that c < (1 − 2ρ)2 min[1−µ
ρ
, 1]. Denote the scheme (f 0ε , S
0
ε )
to be constructed by (fε, Sε) to ease notations. Fix a virtual cost ĉ ∈ (c, (1 −
2ρ)2 min[1−µ
ρ
, 1]). The set of ratings is R = {r0, . . . , rN}, where each rn is non-null,
and the number N is chosen below. Define a number γ ∈ (0, 1], which is a function
of (µ, ρ, ĉ), formally given in (2.15) in Section 2.7, and is used below as a transition
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probability over ratings.
The participation rule of interest, denoted by πε, calls for both types to accept
and truthfully report with probability one. The collection of equilibria of interest,
denoted by (σε, ϕε), is such that the competent type exerts high effort given a rating
r 6= rN and exerts zero effort given rating rN in the induced game G(fε, Sε, C), and
always exerts zero effort in other induced games. The firm’s rejection payoff is ρ, as
the ratings in R are non-null.
The rating system Sε operates as follows and is depicted in Figure 2.2. Upon a
competent report, the initial rating is drawn from the set R according to a distri-
bution λC ≡ (λCn )Nn=0 ∈ ∆(R), which is the stationary distribution over R given the
participation rule πε and the collection of equilibria (σε, ϕε). Given a current rating
r0, a good outcome leads to rating r0 with probability one, and a bad outcome leads
to rating r1 with probability one. Given a current rating rn, 0 < n < N , a good out-
come leads to rating rn−1 with probability γ and to rating rn with probability 1−γ; a
bad outcome leads to rating rn+1 with probability one. Finally, given a current rating
rN , regardless of the outcome, the rating in the next period is rN−1 with probability
(1− ρ)γ and remains as rN with complementary probability.
Upon an inept report, the initial rating is drawn from a set RI := R \ {r0}
according to a distribution λI ≡ (λIn)Nn=1 ∈ ∆(RI), which is chosen such that, given
the participation rule and the distribution λC , consumers’ beliefs upon each rating
rn, n > 0, are identical:
¯
µ := ϕ(rn) =
µλCn
µλCn + (1− µ)λIn
, for each n > 0. (2.13)
The fees fε(C), fε(I) keep each type at the rejection payoff ρ in the collection of
equilibria (σε, ϕε). The fees and distributions are given in Section 2.8.2.
There are two induced beliefs: ϕε(r0) = 1 and ϕε(rn) =
¯
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w.p. (1− ρ)γ















(b) Upon an inept report
Figure 2.2: The rating system Sε
Rating r0 is a separating rating. Ratings rn, n = 1, . . . , N , are pooling ratings. Be-
cause the competent firm exerts high effort upon receiving ratings rn, n = 0, . . . , N−1,
and exerts zero effort upon receiving rating rN , by (2.2), there are three payments
associated with the ratings:
p̄ := p(r0) = 1− ρ,
p
¯
µ := p(rn) = ρ+ (1− 2ρ)
¯
µ, n = 1, . . . , N − 1,
¯
p := p(rN) = ρ.




p. I now argue that (σε, ϕε) is a collection of equilibria
when the firm is sufficiently patient. The arguments that the firm optimally accepts
and reports truthfully, and that the competent firm optimally exerts zero effort in the
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induced games G(fε, Sε, I) and G(fε, Sε,∅) are analogous to those in Section 2.4. I
focus on the competent firm’s effort incentives to “climb up the ladder” for the high
payment p̄ and to avoid the other payments in the induced game G(fε, Sε, C).
The number N ≡ N(µ, ρ, ĉ, ε) of ratings is chosen to be large enough for two
purposes. First, it creates sufficient incentives for high effort when a competent firm
receives the top rating r0. Upon a bad outcome, a competent firm falls down the
ladder; with positive probability, she may then produce more bad outcomes and fall
far down the ladder, receiving a string of low payments. Second, a large enough
N ensures that the competent firm generates large enough surplus for the certifier.
The payoff loss from W̄ incurred by the certifier corresponds to the event that a
competent firm receives rating rN , upon which she exerts zero effort. The probability
that a competent firm receives rating rN falls as N increases and vanishes as N →∞.
Thus, given any ε > 0, one can fix a sufficiently large N such that the certifier receives
a payoff of at least W̄ − ε. When N is large, however, the current rating could be
very far down the competent ladder and it takes a long sequence of good outcomes
to obtain the high payment p̄. The firm thus needs to be patient so that this future
benefit is not discounted too much, which would disrupt incentives for high effort.
Given a larger µ or ρ, it is more difficult to motivate high effort upon rating r0,
as it is more difficult to lower consumers’ beliefs that the firm is competent via the
intermediate ratings. The transition probability γ thus strictly decreases in both µ
and ρ to lengthen the punishment phase upon a bad outcome at rating r0, ensuring
sufficient effort incentives.
2.5.2 An Honors Certification Implementation
To maintain a Markov structure, the scheme constructed in Proposition 2.2 uses
many intermediate ratings that induce identical consumers’ payments. Alternatively,
as I show next, one can think of the scheme as an honors certification implementation
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(fε, S̄ε) of the scheme (fε, Sε) that features only three stationary ratings for any ε > 0.
The certifier privately uses the system Sε and displays a rating (to the firm and
consumers) via the system S̄ε as follows. When the system Sε delivers rating r0,
the system S̄ε displays rating p1 that represents “certified with honors.” When the
system Sε delivers rating rn, n = 1, . . . , N − 1, the system S̄ε displays rating p
¯
µ that
represents “certified.” Finally, when the system Sε delivers rating rN , the system S̄ε
displays rating
¯


















µ as consumers form expectations over ratings




Upon receiving rating p̄, the competent firm infers that her hidden rating is r0
and therefore optimally exerts high effort. Upon receiving rating p
¯
µ, the competent
firm forms an expectation over her hidden ratings and faces an “average” incentive
constraint for high effort. Because the incentive constraints for high effort are satis-
fied in the stationary Markov construction, the “average” constraint holds. Finally,
upon receiving rating
¯
p, the competent firm knows that her hidden rating is rN , and
optimally exerts zero effort.
By construction, both types of the firm earn identical profits from consumers
under Sε and under S̄ε. Thus, the fees that fully extract the net surplus and keep
each type at the rejection payoff ρ under Sε are identical to those under S̄ε.
The associated equilibrium outcome given this honors certification implementation
aligns with causal observations related to honors certification schemes in practice.
Because the number N is chosen to be very large, in each period, the competent firm
is very likely to be “certified.” Occasionally, upon producing a streak of consecutive
good outcomes, the competent firm is “certified with honors” and separates from
an inept type. In rare cases where the competent firm produces a long streak of
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consecutive bad outcomes, her rating becomes “not certified.” On the other hand,
as a consequence of the low certification standard, in each period, the inept type is
very likely to be “certified.” The “certified” rating transfers surpluses produced by
the competent firm to the inept firm, allowing the certifier to extract (almost) the
full net market surplus.
As briefly described in the introduction, a key difficulty in constructing the vir-
tually FSO family of schemes is the conflict between motivating high effort at the
separating rating and introducing transfer ratings. To transfer some net surpluses
from a competent firm and an inept firm, the transfer ratings must motivate high
effort by the competent type and therefore induce a price above ρ. To motivate high
effort at the transfer ratings, there must exist a “top” rating that induce a higher
price. Thus, the competent firm must exert high effort at this top rating. However,
the only channel through which a scheme motivates high effort by the competent
firm at the top rating and allows the certifier to fully extract the net surplus is to
assign transfer ratings to the firm upon a bad outcome. But if the competent firm
obtains the transfer ratings too often, by Bayes’ rule, these ratings cannot induce low
enough consumers’ beliefs, disrupting the incentive for high effort at the top rating.
In the construction, the top rating corresponds to “certified with honors,” inducing
the highest possible price 1 − ρ. The transfer rating “certified” pools all of a firm’s
track records except a long enough streak of consecutive good outcomes and a long
enough streak of consecutive bad outcomes, ensuring that consumers’ belief induced
by the rating is not too high.26
26. Observe that all previous constructions carry over if there are some “intermediate” type of
firm whose effort cost exceeds the competent type’s effort cost, as long as the certifier optimally
incentivizes consistent high effort only from the competent type, and treats the intermediate and
inept types as one “inept type” who in equilibrium exerts zero effort. This is the case, for instance,
when high effort is inefficient for the intermediate type (i.e., her effort cost is such that the static
efficiency condition (2.1) is violated), or when high effort is efficient for the intermediate type but the
prior belief that a firm is an intermediate type is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the certifier optimally
motivates consistent high effort by both the competent and the intermediate types, and leaves some
surplus for the competent type to prevent her from misreporting to be an intermediate type (i.e.,
to satisfy incentive compatibility in the certifier’s problem). This disrupts full extraction, but the
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Finally, I remark on why much of the structure in the above constructions extends
to the case of K > 0. When consumers observe more past ratings, the competent
firm faces a stronger temptation to exert zero effort at the top rating r0. Even if the
firm produces a bad outcome at rating r0, the next K consumers see that the firm
received rating r0 before. Given (virtually) consistent high effort, these consumers
pay the firm the highest payment p̄, even if the current ratings are not r0. To motivate
high effort at rating r0, the certifier can lower the transition probability γ to some
carefully chosen γK < γ, as defined in (2.15) in Section 2.7, to effectively lengthen
the punishment phase upon a bad outcome at rating r0.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
To conclude, this paper begins with the observation that a key role of firm certifi-
cation schemes is to address adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard problem.
Yet, certification schemes often appear counterproductive to do so. Specifically, in
practice, honors certification schemes are pervasive, and many such schemes feature
low certification standards. My results show how a certifier uses low-standard, hon-
ors certification schemes that trade off screening and incentives for quality provisions
to maximize profits. Importantly, the results show that such schemes fully alleviate
dynamic moral hazard and can maximize social welfare.
I close the paper with a brief discussion of some of the assumptions that I made in
my analysis. First, I have followed the mechanism-design approach to certification in
the literature (see, e.g., Albano and Lizzeri, 2001), and allowed the certifier to offer
a menu of schemes that discriminates against different types of firms. In contrast,
following the traditional “industrial organization” approach, one might be interested
in schemes in which the fee and the system are independent of a firm’s type, as is
main insights on the honors certification structure and low certification standards carry over.
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often the case in practice when certifying the quality of a finished product. I construct
such a scheme in Section 2.9. The range of costs over which the scheme can induce
efficiency is smaller, as the scheme does not feature a rating that separates both types
and creates stronger incentives for high effort.
Moreover, I have considered a setting in which the certifier fully extracts the
net surplus from the participating firms. Full extraction by a monopoly certifier is a
familiar result from the certification literature. To be clear, there are different frictions
in practice that may rule out full extraction, but they are beyond the scope of this
paper. For example, full extraction requires a firm to accept a scheme when she is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting. One might reasonably argue that a firm
rejects for sure whenever she is indifferent. This might be due to reasons outside of
the model, say, because signing up for certification is costly. To attract participation,
the certifier might then offer a firm some additional surplus that compensates for
the cost, and the remainder of the present construction carries over. Another setting
that possibly rules out full extraction and is also beyond the scope of this paper, is
competition between multiple certifiers.
Finally, as a first step towards examining the design of dynamic firm certification,
my analysis has focused on full-surplus optimality. The solution to the certifier’s profit
maximization problem when full-surplus optimality is not even virtually attainable,
i.e., when the effort cost is such that c > (1− 2ρ)2, is an open question. In this case,
the exact solution to the certifiers problem requires keeping track of histories after
which the certifier would like a competent firm to exert high effort and those after
which the certifier would like the firm to shirk and then optimizing over all schemes.
(Of course, when the cost is sufficient large, the certifier cannot induce any high effort
and thus obtain a revenue of zero.) I leave this for future research.
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2.7 Appendix A: Past Rating Observations
In this appendix, I assume that each consumer observes the current rating as well as a
finite number K of most recent past ratings. To illustrate the additional difficulty that
the certifier faces when consumers observe some past ratings, I begin by re-examining
the simple, binary rating structure in Section 2.4 with the assumption that K = 1.
I then generalize the construction of the virtually FSO family of schemes in the case
of K = 0 below Proposition 2.2 in the main text to the case of any finite K ≥ 0.
2.7.1 Finitely Many Past Observations
Example 1 (Binary ratings with K = 1). Consider a scheme (f ′2, S2), where the
system S2 is as in Proposition 2.1 and the fee f
′
2 is such that the certifier extracts
a firm’s revenue from consumers up to her rejection payoff ρ given the participation
rule and collection of equilibria described below. The fee f ′2 is different from the
fee f2 in Proposition 2.1, as consumers’ beliefs and hence payments are different
when K = 1. The participation rule again calls for each type to accept and report
truthfully. Moreover, the collection of equilibria is again such that the competent
type consistently exerts high effort upon accepting and truthfully reporting.
Contrary to the case of K = 0, each consumer forms a belief that the firm is
competent given a current rating and the most recent past rating. Similar to the
case of K = 0, there are two stationary beliefs on the firm being competent and two
(stationary) payments. The belief is µ̃1 :=
µρ2
µρ2+1−µ if both ratings are the pooling
rating r1, and the belief is 1 otherwise. Payment, as given by (2.2), is ρ+ µ̃1(1− 2ρ)
if both ratings the consumer observes are r1 and is 1 − ρ otherwise. The following
holds:
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Proposition 2.3. Fix (µ, ρ, δ). The scheme (f ′2, S2) is FSO if and only if




The proof of this proposition, containing the detailed calculations, is relegated to
Section 2.9. Note that c̄′2 < c̄2, where c̄2 is the cost cutoff for the scheme (f2, S2) to be
FSO when K = 0, because it is more difficult to incentivize consistent high effort by
the competent firm when consumers also observe the most recent past rating. Specif-
ically, here, the competent firm is more tempted to exert zero effort when she receives
a current (separating) rating r0. Upon producing a bad outcome such that the next
rating becomes r1, the next consumer still sees that the firm has received a current
rating r0 in the past. This consumer also believes that the firm is competent who
will exert high effort and thus pays the firm a high payment 1− ρ. This weakens the
punishment upon a bad outcome and in turn weakens the competent firm’s incentive
to exert high effort when she receives a current rating r0. 
The weakened incentives for high effort when receiving a separating rating can be
restored by strengthening punishment upon a bad outcome and requiring a firm to
be sufficiently patient, as in the construction for the case of K = 0 in Proposition
2.2 in the main text. I now present the construction of a virtually FSO family
{(fKε , SKε )|ε > 0} of schemes when consumers observe the current ratings as well as
any finite K most recent past ratings, generalizing the construction in Section 2.5 in
the main text.
Construction. Fix (µ, ρ, c,K, ε) such that c < (1− 2ρ)2 min[1−µ
ρ
, 1]. Fix a virtual
cost ĉ ∈ (c, (1 − 2ρ)2 min[1−µ
ρ
, 1]). In the scheme (fKε , S
K
ε ), the set of ratings is
R = {r0, . . . , rN} and rn 6= ∅ for each n, where N > K+1 is chosen to be sufficiently
large for reasons as outlined in the main text. The participation rule and the collection
of equilibria are as in the case of K = 0. Specifically, the participation rule, denoted
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by πKε , calls for both types to accept with probability one and then truthfully report.
The collection of equilibria, denoted by (σKε , ϕ
K
ε ), is such that in the induced game
upon a competent report, the competent firm exerts high effort given a current rating
r 6= rN and exerts zero effort given a current rating rN ; in other induced games, the
competent firm always exerts zero effort.
Rating transitions upon each report are depicted in Figure 2.3 below. Define
γK(µ, ρ) =







As explained below, the transition probability γ in the construction below Proposition
2.2 in the main text is γK evaluated at K = 0. By definition, γK ∈ (0, 1], for each
K. The initial rating upon a competent report is drawn according to the stationary
distribution over the set of ratingsR, given the participation rule πKε and the collection
of equilibria (σKε , ϕ
K
ε ). Given a current rating r0, the next rating is r0 upon a good
outcome and is r1 upon a bad outcome. Given a current rating rn, n = 1, . . . , N − 1,
upon a good outcome, the next rating is rn−1 with probability γ
K and is rn with
probability 1 − γK ; upon a bad outcome, the next rating is rn+1. Finally, given a
current rating rN , the next rating is rN−1 with probability (1− ρ)γK and is rN with
probability 1− (1− ρ)γK , independent of the realized current outcome.
The initial rating upon an inept report is drawn according to the stationary distri-
bution over the set R\{r0}, given the participation rule πKε and the collection of equi-
libria (σKε , ϕ
K
ε ). All rating transitions are exogenous, i.e., independent of outcomes
produced by the firm. Given a current rating r1, the next rating is r1 with probability
1 − ρ and is r2 with probability ρ. Given a current rating rn, n = 2, . . . , N − 1, the
next rating is rn−1 with probability (1−ρ)γK , rn with probability (1−ρ)(1−γK) and
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rn+1 with probability ρ. Finally, given a current rating rN , the next rating is rN−1
with probability (1− ρ)γK and is rN with probability 1− (1− ρ)γK .
This general construction when evaluated at K = 0 is identical to the construction
below Proposition 2.2 in the main text, except that the rating transitions upon an
inept report are different. Specifically, in the main text, ratings are drawn once and
for all upon an inept report, and the initial distribution over the inept ratings equals
the stationary distribution given the transitions upon an inept report in the current
general construction. In fact, these two specifications are equivalent in the case of
K = 0 for the analysis, because, upon screening a firms type via her report in an FSO
scheme, the rating transitions after an inept report matter only to the extent that
the corresponding stationary distribution affects consumers beliefs on the firms type.
In particular, the transition probability γ in the construction below Proposition 2.2
in the main text is plainly γK , defined in (2.15) when evaluated at K = 0.
As discussed in the main text, the transition probability γK are chosen to ensure
that the competent type optimally exerts high effort at rating r0. When the virtual
cost ĉ is sufficiently small, pure transitions (γK = 1) between ratings suffice given
any c < (1− 2ρ)2 if the firm is sufficiently patient. In contrast, when the virtual cost
is large (but smaller than (1 − 2ρ)2), the system must feature mixed transitions to
effectively lengthen the punishment phase upon a bad outcome at the top rating r0.
Again, the payoff loss incurred by the certifier from the upper bound W̄ corre-
sponds to the event that a competent firm receives rating rN , upon which she exerts
zero effort. The probability that a competent firm receives rating rN strictly decreases
in N , and vanishes as N →∞. The number of ratings N is chosen to be large enough
to ensure that the payoff loss incurred by the certifier falls short of ε, as in the main
text.
Observe that much of the rating structure from the case of K = 0 carry over.
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(b) Upon an inept report
Figure 2.3: Rating transitions
report are exogenous. Finally, these transitions are such that, whenever the ratings
that a consumer observes do not include rating r0, its belief that the firm is competent














Again, there are two (stationary) beliefs on the firm’s type being competent, 1 and
¯
µK . There are three payments: p̄ = 1 − ρ when a consumer observes a rating r0
(among the ratings it observes), p
¯
µK = ρ +
¯
µK(1 − 2ρ) when a consumer does not
observe a rating r0 and the current rating is not rN , and
¯
p if the current rating is rN .
The scheme thus again has a simple stationary non-Markovian implementation with
three non-null ratings.
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The reason why much of the rating structure from the case of K = 0 easily
extends is as follows. As mentioned, the key difficulty when consumers observe more
past ratings is that the competent firm faces a stronger temptation to shirk when
receiving a current rating r0. Given the prescribed equilibrium in the induced game
upon a competent report, even if the firm produces a bad outcome when receiving
rating r0, the next K entering consumers still see that the firm has received the rating
r0 before. These consumers also pay the firm the highest payment p̄, even when the
current ratings are not r0. To ensure sufficient effort incentives when the firm receives
a current rating r0, the transition probability γ
K to climb up strictly decreases in the
number of past observations K. Upon producing a bad outcome at rating r0, the
firm finds it harder to climb back up to the top rating r0. The periods in which the
firm receives the payment p̄ also more likely terminate, at which point the firm starts
collecting lower payments. The competent firm who is receiving a lower payment
(again) finds it harder to climb up the ladder and receive the highest payment p̄. A
sufficiently patient competent firm thus optimally exerts high effort at rating r0.
2.8 Appendix B: Omitted Details
2.8.1 The Scheme (f2, S2)
It remains to specify the fees:

















2.8.2 The Scheme (fKε , S
K
ε )
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, n = 1, . . . , N.
2.9 Appendix C: Supplementary Details
This supplement is organized as follows. First, I provide a further discussion on the
construction of the virtually FSO family of schemes in the main text. I complement
the discussion with four numerical examples in the case of K = 0. I then consider the
case of K =∞, in which consumers observe an infinite history of past ratings. In this
case, I show that full-surplus optimality fails (even virtually). Finally, I construct a
FSO scheme that is independent of the firm’s type report.
2.9.1 Virtual Full-Surplus Optimality
In this section, I discuss the economic forces behind the construction of the virtually
FSO family of schemes in Proposition 2.2.
Moral hazard and rating structure. To understand the use of many stationary
Markov ratings in Proposition 2.2, Proposition 2.4 below derives a cost upper bound
given (µ, ρ, δ) above which efficiency fails when schemes are restricted to be stationary
Markov.
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Proposition 2.4. Fix a scheme (f, S) that is stationary Markov given a participation
rule π and a collection of equilibria (σ, ϕ). Let n be the number of ratings that are
displayed with positive probability. If (σ, ϕ) is efficient, then






< δ(1− 2ρ)2 = c̄.
Finiteness and a stationary Markov structure restrict the extent to which con-
sumers’ beliefs, and hence payments and a firm’s continuation profit upon a bad
outcome can fall. They in turn restrict the range of cost over which efficiency can be
incentivized in equilibrium.
When n = 2, the cost bound in Proposition 2.4 coincides with c̄2, which is defined
in (2.8). Thus, the cutoff c̄2 is tight in the sense that there is a stationary Markov
FSO scheme that display two ratings if and only if c ≤ c̄2. For n > 2, the problem
becomes less tractable and the cost bound in Proposition 2.4 is not tight in general.
In Section 2.9.2, I present four numerical examples in the case of K = 0 to illustrate
several insights. I show that the tight cost upper bound c̄n (given µ, ρ and δ) for a
stationary Markov FSO scheme with n ratings to exist equals the value of a minimiza-
tion problem over two n×n probability transition matrices upon a competent report
and a n-dimensional probability vector upon an inept report. The solutions to the
problem, namely, the two matrices and the vector, are nontrivial functions of (µ, ρ, δ).
Moreover, fixing (µ, ρ, δ), c̄n need not strictly increase in n. By using more stationary
Markov ratings, the certifier can induce lower payments for punishment and create
stronger effort incentives, but he also introduces new incentive constraints for high
effort upon the additional ratings. Nonetheless, in Section 2.9.2, I also show that for
several parameter values (µ, ρ), c̄n strictly increases when moving from n = 2 to 3, and
when the incentive constraints are evaluated in the limit δ → 1. Such monotonicity
due to patience is a virtue and motivates my focus on virtual full-surplus optimality
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for high effort costs.
The role of patience. To further illustrate the role that patience plays for effi-
ciency, I now turn to a negative result. I show that, for any fixed (µ, ρ, δ), there
exist a costs large enough (but strictly smaller than c̄) such that efficiency fails in
equilibrium:
Proposition 2.5. Fix (µ, ρ, δ). There is η ≡ η(µ, ρ, δ) > 0 such that for some ĉ(η) <
c̄, where c̄ is defined in (2.7), the certifier’s payoff is less than µ(1− 2ρ− c)− η > 0
whenever c ≥ ĉ(η).
To motivate consistent high effort by a competent firm when c is arbitrarily close
to c̄, punishment upon a bad outcome after any history must be made as harsh as
possible. Because of discounting, such harsh punishments include the use of ratings
that induce sufficiently low consumers’ beliefs that the firm is competent soon enough
after a bad outcome. But if these ratings are realized soon enough upon a bad outcome
after any history by the competent type, consumers’ beliefs that the firm is competent
upon such ratings cannot be too small, yielding a contradiction.
The incentive constraints for high effort can be relaxed by introducing a “bad”
rating that induces zero effort by the competent firm, and hence a payment ρ, as in
the construction in Proposition 2.2. But Proposition 2.5 says that the certifier cannot
obtain a payoff arbitrarily close to W̄ when c is sufficiently close to c̄. This would
require that the probability of receiving the bad rating be arbitrarily close to zero,
in which case this bad rating would have a negligible effect on the competent firm’s
effort incentives.
2.9.2 Numerical Examples
In the examples, I focus on the competent firm’s incentive constraints for high effort
upon accepting and reporting truthfully. Given the certifier’s ability to screen, it is
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then straightforward to choose a participation rule and fees to incentivize participa-
tion by both types and fully extract a participating firm, obtaining a FSO scheme as
in Propositions 2.1 and 2.2.
Finally, note that in the case of K = 0, it is without loss to assume that the system
upon an inept report specifies only absorbing states when constructing stationary
Markov schemes. This is because, upon screening a firms type via her report in a
FSO scheme, the rating transitions after an inept report matter only to the extent
that the corresponding stationary distribution affects consumers beliefs on the firms
type.
Three Stationary Markov Ratings
Example 2 illustrates that given (µ, ρ, δ), the certifier may achieve full-surplus opti-
mality for a range of costs beyond c̄2.






), so that c̄2 ≈ 0.303.
There are three ratings, labeled r0, r1 and r2. Upon a competent report, rating
transitions are depicted below in Figure 2.4. The initial distribution on {r0, r1, r2} is







r2, [0.41] r1, [0.51] r0, [1](0, 1)




Figure 2.4: Transitions upon a competent report
Each node is labeled by the rating, followed by the corresponding belief in squared brackets. Tran-
sition probabilities are written in the form (x, y) and rounded up to two decimal places, where x
denotes the probability upon a good outcome and y denotes the probability upon a bad outcome.
Transitions upon an inept report is depicted by Figure 2.5 below. The initial
distribution over the ratings {r0, r1, r2} is (0, 0.86, 0.14). The ratings are absorbing.
84
r2, [0.41] r1, [0.51](1, 1) (1, 1)
Figure 2.5: Transitions upon an Inept Report
The continuation profit Vn upon each rating rn by the competent firm in an
efficient equilibrium satisfies the following Bellman equation:
Vn = (1− δ)(p(rn)− c) + δ((1− ρ)Vmax(n−1,0) + ρVmin(n+1,2)), n = 0, 1, 2.
The incentive constraint for high effort upon each rating rn is
δ
1− δ
(1− 2ρ)(Vmax(n−1,0) − Vmin(n+1,2)) ≥ c.
The maximum cost below which consistent high effort holds in equilibrium is therefore
δ(1− 2ρ)
1− δ
min(V0 − V1, V0 − V2, V1 − V2) ≈ 0.31 > c̄2.

To see why more ratings may relax the cost threshold, it is instructive to compare
the transitions in Figure 2.4 to those upon a competent report in the scheme (f2, S2),
depicted in Figure 2.6 below.




Figure 2.6: Transitions in the system S2 upon a competent report
The use of more ratings allows the certifier to “push” consumers’ beliefs towards
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0 by statistically revealing more bad outcomes in a firm’s track record, lowering
consumer payments associated with “low” ratings to create stronger effort incentives.
The downside is the inevitable introduction of additional incentive constraints for
high effort upon observing the additional ratings. Ratings that induce intermediate
beliefs may adversely create a “cushion” that weakens effort incentives. Of course,
the certifier can always use a smaller amount of ratings than the available ones by
not allowing some ratings to be realized with positive probability.
Interestingly, the certifier can achieve full-surplus optimality for an even larger
range of costs if he dispenses with the ladder structure. Example 3 below illustrates.
Example 3 (Three ratings with mixed transitions). Departing from Example 2, con-
sider instead the following transitions upon a competent report depicted in Figure 2.7
below, with the initial distribution being the stationary distribution (0.79, 0.2, 0.01).
Transitions upon an inept report are depicted in Figure 2.8 below, with the initial
distribution being (0, 0.76, 0.24).









Figure 2.7: Transitions upon competent report
Let αmn denote the transition probability from rating rm to rating rn upon a good
outcome in the competent system, and let βmn denote the counterpart upon a bad
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r2, [0.33] r1, [0.7](1, 1) (1, 1)
Figure 2.8: Transitions upon inept report
outcome. The competent firm’s continuation profit Vn upon each rating rn satisfies
Vm = (1− δ)(p(m)− c) + δ
2∑
n=0
((1− ρ)αmn + ρβmn)Vn, m, n = 0, 1, 2.
Using the fact that αm2 = 1 − αm0 − αm1 and βm2 = 1 − βm0 − βm1, the incentive





(αmn − βmn)(V0 − Vn)
]
≥ c.







(αmn − βmn)(V0 − Vn)
]
≈ 0.35 > 0.31.

Example 4 shows, however, three stationary and Markov ratings need not improve
upon two.
Example 4 (Three ratings with mixed transitions and low prior). Departing from
Example 3, keep δ = 9
10
and ρ = 1
10
, but suppose that µ = 1
100
. This gives c̄2 ≈ 0.575.
Choosing new transition probabilities (αmn, βmn)m,n=0,1,2 and new initial distribution
λI over inept ratings (and fixing the initial distribution λC over competent ratings to
be the stationary distribution given the new transitions), the maximum cost below
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(αmn − βmn)(V0 − Vn)
]
≈ 0.572,
which does not improve over c̄2. 
The key force behind why no improvement obtains is the low prior µ. Beliefs and
hence prices induced by the two pooling ratings are too close, and a firm finds it
suboptimal to exert costly effort for a negligible change in consumer payments.
Nonetheless, I show numerically in Example 5 below that for many parameter
values (µ, ρ), an improvement obtains when moving from two to three stationary
Markov ratings, if the incentive constraints are evaluated at the patient limit δ → 1.
An arbitrarily patient competent firm still wishes to exert effort to achieve a rating
that induces a higher consumer’s belief, despite this increase in belief may be small.
Example 5 (Cost cutoff and monotonicity at the patient limit). The above examples
reveal that in general, the maximum cost below which efficiency obtains in equilibrium
with n ratings is given by


















When the incentive constraints for high effort are evaluated at the patient limit δ → 1,
the limit cost cutoff is given by






















Table 2.1 below computes numerically the cutoff (2.20) at (µ, ρ) ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}×
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. The cutoff (2.20) increases as the certifier moves from two to three
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stationary Markov ratings.27 It suggests that as n→∞, the cutoff (2.20) approaches
(1−2ρ)2 min[1−µ
ρ
, 1], which is the bound on effort cost identified in Proposition 2.2. 
ρ


































































Table 2.1: Limiting cost cutoffs (2.20)
Each cell of the table consists of, from top to bottom, the limit cutoff c̄∗n for n = 2, 3 and the limit
upper bound (1− 2ρ)2 min[ 1−µρ , 1], rounded to two decimal places.
Monotonicity due to patience is a virtue. As the first three examples illustrate,
the solution to (2.19) is in general a non-trivial function of (µ, ρ, δ): a ladder struc-
ture does not suffice, and requires solving for non-trivial transition probabilities
(αms, βms)
n−1
m,s=0 as well as the inept stationary distribution. In fact, these observations
motivate the constructions in the main result of the paper, Proposition 2.2.
27. The details involved in evaluating the unnormalized difference in continuation profits in (2.20)
are contained in the proof of Proposition 2.2.
89
2.9.3 Infinite Past Ratings Observation
In this section, I show that full-surplus optimality fails (even virtually) if consumers
observe the current ratings as well as all past ratings, i.e., K =∞.
Proposition 2.6. Fix (µ, ρ, c,K) such that c < (1− 2ρ)2 and K ≤ ∞. Suppose that
for ε > 0, there is a scheme given which, there is a sequence {δm}∞m=0 converging to
1 such that for every m ≥ Mε for some Mε > 0, the certifier’s optimal payoff is at
least W̄ − ε given a discount factor δm. Then K <∞.
For the certifier to virtually obtain W̄ , the competent firm must virtually con-
sistently exert high effort on path. Given K = ∞, consumers’ beliefs that the firm
is competent tend to drift up and converge to 1. The competent firm’s payoff after
any history on path in the patient limit must then equal 1 − ρ − c. However, once
consumers’ beliefs become close to one, to motivate high effort at any given history,
the competent firm must face a positive-probability punishment phase in which she
receives low payments, and such punishment phase must not vanish in the patient
limit. The competent firm’s continuation payoff after any history on path in the
patient limit must therefore be strictly smaller than 1− ρ− c. This yields a contra-
diction.
The solution to the certifier’s problem when K =∞ thus requires the certifier to
incentivize high effort by the competent firm after specific histories and shirking after
other histories. Solving for the certifier’s optimal payoff might become intractable,
but the fundamental insight that the certifier wishes to maximize a firm’s expected
value to consumers via coarse and opaque ratings remains.
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2.9.4 A Type-Independent, Full-Surplus-Optimal Scheme
In this section, I construct a type-independent scheme (f ′2, S
′
2) that is FSO whenever
c ≤ c̄′2(µ, ρ, δ) =
δ(1− µ)µ(1− 2ρ)3
(1− ρ− µ(1− 2ρ))(ρ+ µ(1− 2ρ))
. (2.21)
The system S ′2 displays a rating r0 with probability 1 upon a good outcome with
some probability α, and a rating r1 otherwise in each period. The probability α is
α :=
c(ρ+ µ(1− 2ρ))
c(ρ+ µ(1− 2ρ))2 + δ(1− µ)µ(1− 2ρ)3
, (2.22)
which belongs to (0, 1] when Condition (2.21) below holds. The fee f ′2 is




(ρ+ µ(1− 2ρ))(1− α(ρ+ µ(1− 2ρ)))
]
. (2.23)
The participation rule specifies that both types accept and report truthfully. The
competent firm always exerts high effort in the induced game G(f ′2, S
′
2, C), and always




2(I) is set to
keep a participating firm at her rejection payoff ρ.
Proposition 2.7. The scheme (f ′2, S
′
2) is FSO whenever (2.21) holds.
Rating r1 in period 0 does not reflect any past outcome, thus ϕ0(r1) = µ. In
each period t ≥ 1, the two ratings statistically reveal the outcome in the last period,
inducing two possible levels of reputations:
ϕt(0) =
µ(1− α(1− ρ))
µ(1− α(1− ρ)) + (1− µ)(1− αρ)
< ϕt(1) =
µ(1− ρ)
µ(1− ρ) + (1− µ)ρ
.
Consistent high effort again implies that pt(1) > pt(0) for each t ≥ 1. When (2.21)
holds, the competent firm consistently exerts high effort for the higher payment pt(1).
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Note that c̄′2 < c̄2.
28 This is because the two ratings in this construction pool
both types of firms, making it more difficult to motivate consistent high effort by the
competent firm.
Notice also that the scheme must induce a competent firm to be indifferent between
high or low effort after every history upon acceptance (and must induce both types
to accept). The reason is that, for full extraction, a fee independent of the report
must bind both types individual rationality constraints, keeping them at the rejection
payoff. This requires both types to extract identical expected profits from consumers.
However, efficiency requires that the competent firm be motivated to secure higher
profits by separating herself from an inept type.
2.10 Appendix D: Proofs
2.10.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
It remains to show the converse and that (2.7) is necessary for efficiency. I first show
the converse. Fix a scheme and a participation rule that solve the certifier’s prob-
lem. Since a firm truthfully reports upon acceptance given incentive compatibility,
efficiency implies that the participation rule satisfies full competent acceptance. By
(2.6), the certifier achieves W̄ .
I now show that (2.7) is necessary for efficiency. Recall from the main text that
efficiency implies full competent acceptance. Thus, given efficiency, the incentive
constraint for high effort after each history h must hold in the induced game upon a
competent report. By exerting high effort, the competent firm’s continuation profit
28. To see this, note that the inequality can be simplified to (1− ρ)/(1− 2ρ) > (2− µ)µ. The left
side is strictly larger than 1 for ρ ∈ (0, 12 ). The right side is bounded above by 1.
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following a history h in period t in which a rating r realizes is
V = (1− δ)(pt(r)− c) + δ((1− ρ)V (hȳ) + ρV (h
¯
y)),
where V (hy) denotes the expected continuation profit upon producing an outcome y
after history h. It suffices to verify that it is not profitable for the firm to deviate to
zero effort, since cost is linear in effort. A one-stage deviation to zero effort gives
V ′ = (1− δ)pt(r) + δ(ρV (hȳ) + (1− ρ)V (h
¯
y)).
The incentive constraint, V − V ′ ≥ 0, can therefore be simplified as
V (hȳ)− V ′(h
¯




V (hȳ) ≤ (1− δ)(1− ρ− c) + δ((1− ρ)V (hȳȳ) + ρV (hȳ
¯
y))
≤ (1− δ)(1− ρ− c) + δ
(
V (hȳȳ)− (1− δ)ρc
δ(1− 2ρ)
)






y) > (1− δ)(ρ− c) + δ((1− ρ)V (h
¯















> · · · ≥ ρ− c+ (1− ρ)c
1− 2ρ
. (2.26)
This inequality is strict because payments, given in (2.2), are always strictly bigger
than ρ given consistent high effort. (2.24), (2.25) and (2.26) together imply that
c < δ(1− 2ρ)2.
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2.10.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Given the fees and the participation rule, it is straightforward to compute that the
certifier’s expected payoff equals W̄ . I show that (σ∗, ϕ∗) is a collection of equilibria
when (2.8) holds. Consider the game G(f2, S2, C). The competent firm’s play in
G(f2, S2, C) can be represented by a two-state automaton, with the set of states
given by the set of ratings. Here, a state r collects all firm’s histories with the most
recent rating being r. Let V (r) be the competent firm’s continuation profit in state
r:





and p(r0) = 1− ρ.
A deviation to shirk yields
V (r;
¯
e) := (1− δ)p(r) + δ[ρV (r0) + (1− ρ)V (r1)].
The incentive constraint for high effort V (r) − V (r;
¯
e) ≥ 0 in each state r can be
simplified to δ(1− 2ρ)(p(r0)− p(r1)) ≥ c, or equivalently, (2.8).
The competent type finds no profitable deviation from the participation rule π∗.
By accepting and reporting truthfully, the competent firm’s payoff equals ρ by con-
struction. By deviating to misreport upon acceptance, consumers pay the firm p(r1)
in each period because only rating r1 is displayed in the induced game G(f2, S2, I),
and the competent firm’s payoff equals ρ. By deviating to reject, the firm’s payoff
equals ρ. Finally, the inept type also finds no profitable deviation from the participa-
tion rule π∗. By accepting and reporting truthfully, the inept firm’s payoff equals ρ.
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By accepting and misreporting, the inept firm’s payoff is at most ρ by construction,
whenever c ≤ c̄2. Finally, by deviating to reject, the inept firm’s payoff equals ρ.
2.10.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Necessity of Condition (2.12). Fix ε > 0 and a scheme given which there is a
sequence {δm}∞m=0 converging to 1 such that for every m ≥Mε for some Mε > 0, the
certifier’s payoff is at least W̄ − ε given a discount factor δm for some participation
rule and some collection of equilibria. Fix such a sequence {δm}∞m=0, Mε and m ≥
Mε. Next, fix a sequence {xm}m≥Mε where each xm ∈ (0, 1) is chosen below to be
sufficiently small, with the properties that lim infm xm =: x > 0 and δm(1 − xm) <
δm+1(1− xm+1) for each m. I first argue that given any histories h, h′ in the induced
game upon a competent report, the competent firm’s continuation payoffs V (h), V (h′)
at the histories upon accepting and truthfully reporting must satisfy
∣∣∣∣V (h)− V (h′)1− δm
∣∣∣∣ < D := 1− ρ(4(1− ρ) + c)ρx (2.27)






V0 = (1− δm)(1− ρ− c) + δ((1− ρα)V0 + ραV1), (2.28)
V1 = (1− δm)(ρ− c) + δm(xmV0 + (1− xm)V1), (2.29)
δmα(1− 2ρ)(V0 − V1) ≥ (1− δm)c. (2.30)
The program can be interpreted as follows. The values V0, V1 are upper and lower
bounds on the competent firm’s continuation payoff after any history in the induced
95
game upon acceptance and truthfully reporting. There are two states, 0 and 1,
associated with the continuation values V0 and V1. In state 0, the firm receives the
stage payoff 1− ρ− c, as if she exerts high effort, subject to incentive constraint for
high effort (2.30). In state 1, the firm receives a payoff ρ− c, which is strictly lower
than her lowest stage payoff. Given state 0, with probability 1−ρ+ρ(1−α) = 1−ρα,
the next state is 0 and with complementary probability, the next state is 1. This is
as if, given high effort in state 0, the next state is 0 with probability one upon a
good outcome, or with probability 1 − α upon a bad outcome. Given state 1, with
probability xm, the next state is 0 and with complementary probability, the next state
is 1. Since the certifier’s optimal payoff is at least W̄−ε given a discount factor δm, to
derive the upper and lower bounds on V (h) after any history h, it suffices to consider
to a transition probability xm > 0, which is chosen to be sufficiently small and satisfy
the properties mentioned above to ensure that V1 is a lower bound on the competent
firm’s continuation payoff after any history in the induced game upon a competent
report. Such a sequence {xm}m≥Mε exists because limxm→0 V1 = ρ − c, which is
strictly smaller than a competent firm’s lowest equilibrium continuation profit ρ in
the induced game upon a competent report.
At the optimum of the program, the constraint (2.30) binds, and the optimal
value of α is such that given a current state 0, the probability of staying at state 0 is
maximized without violating the constraint (2.30). Hence, at the optimum, V0 (resp.,
V1) gives an upper (resp., lower) bound on the competent firm’s continuation payoff
after any history: V1 < V (h) ≤ V0 after any history h in the induced game upon a
competent report. The lower bound is strict because the competent firm’s payoff in
each period is strictly above ρ − c. Thus,
∣∣V (h)−V (h′)
1−δm
∣∣ < Dm. Solving (2.28), (2.29)
and (2.30) simultaneously for V0, V1, α gives
Dm =
1− ρ(4(1− ρ) + c)
(1− 2ρ)(1− δm(1− xm))
.
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This value strictly increases in m, and hence
Dm < lim sup
m→∞
Dm =
1− ρ(4(1− ρ) + c)
ρx
.
Now, fix an arbitrary ψ > 0. Given the bound (2.27), by Ross (2014, Theorem
2.2, p.95), there exists a bounded function `(h) for each history h and a constant g
satisfying
g + `(ht) = p(ht)− c+ (1− ρ)E
PCC
ht+1











V (h)− V (h∗)
1− δm
,
where p(h) denotes consumer’s payment at history h and h∗ is chosen at which the
competent firm exerts high effort and such that
0 ≤ sup
h
`(h)− `(h∗) ≤ ψ. (2.31)
The incentive constraint for high effort at history h∗ is
δm(1− 2ρ)
















It follows from the incentive constraint that
δm(1− 2ρ)(`(h∗ȳ)− `(h∗
¯
y)) = δm(1− 2ρ) lim
m→∞








y)) ≥ c ⇐⇒ δm
(


















where ϕ(h) denotes consumers’ belief that the firm is competent at history h in the
induced game upon a competent report. By construction, `(h∗ȳ) ≤ ψ and µ ≤
E
PCC
h [ϕ(h)]. The above inequality implies that
δm
(





Since ψ > 0 is chosen arbitrarily, it must hold that
δm(1− 2ρ)(1− µ) ≥
ρc
1− 2ρ






This proves the necessity of Condition (2.12).
Verify that the construction constitutes a virtually FSO family of schemes.
Fix some N > K+1, chosen below to be sufficiently large. State variables that govern
a competent firm’s continuation payoff are given by a vector (k, r), consisting of the
current rating r and the number k ≥ 1 of past periods since rating 0 is most recently
realized, as these two numbers pin down consumers’ beliefs and the firm’s effort
98
choices. The state transitions are as follows. Given a current state (k, r0) for any
k, the next state is (1, r0) upon a good outcome and is (1, r1) upon a bad outcome.
Given a current state (k, rn) for any k, and n = 1, . . . , N − 1, upon a good outcome,
the next state is (k + 1, rn−1) with probability γ
K and is (k + 1, rn) with probability
1− γK ; upon a bad outcome, the next state is (k + 1, rn+1). Finally, given a current
state (k, rN) for any k, the next state is (k+ 1, rN−1) with probability γ
K(1− ρ) and
is (k + 1, rN) with complementary probability.
Let V(k,n) denote the continuation payoff of the competent firm given a state (k, rn),
the participation rule and the collection of equilibria. The continuation payoffs satisfy
V(k,0) =: V0, k = 1, . . . , K,
V(k,n) =: Vn, k ≥ K + 1, n = 1, . . . , N,
and the system of Bellman equations
V0 = (1− δ)(1− ρ− c) + δ((1− ρ)V0 + ρV(1,1)),
V(k,n) = (1− δ)(1− ρ− c) + δ((1− ρ)γKV(k+1,n−1)
+ (1− ρ)(1− γK)V(k+1,n) + ρV(k+1,n+1)), k = 1, . . . , K, n = 1, . . . , k,
Vn = (1− δ)(p
¯
µK − c) + δ((1− ρ)γKVn−1
+ (1− ρ)(1− γK)Vn + ρVn+1), n = 1, . . . , N − 1,
VN = (1− δ)ρ+ ((1− ρ)γKVN−1 + (1− (1− ρ)γK)VN).
This linear system of K(K+1)/2+N+1 equations has K(K+1)/2+N+1 unknowns,
namely, the continuation payoffs, and admits a unique solution.
It suffices to verify that the incentive constraints for high effort in the patient
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γKV(k+1,n−1) + (1− γK)V(k+1,n) − V(k+1,n+1)
1− δ
)






γKVn−1 + (1− γK)Vn − Vn+1
1− δ
)
> c, n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
(2.35)
Since the strategy profile σKε induces an irreducible Markov chain over a finite set
of K(K + 1)/2 + N + 1 states upon a competent report, Ross (2014, Theorem 2.4)




uniformly bounded over k, n and δ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, by Ross (2014, Theorem 2.2),
























µK − c) + λCNρ.
Second, the following system
gN = 1− ρ− c+ ρ`N(1,1),
gN + `N(k,n) = 1− ρ− c+ (1− ρ)γK`N(k+1,n−1)
+ (1− ρ)(1− γK)`N(k+1,n) + ρ`N(k+1,n+1), k = 1, . . . , K, n = 1, . . . , k.
gN + `Nn = p
¯
µK − c+ (1− ρ)γK`Nn−1 + (1− ρ)(1− γK)`Nn + ρ`Nn+1, n = 1, . . . , N − 1,
gN + `NN = ρ+ (1− ρ)γK`NN−1 + (1− (1− ρ)γK)`NN ,
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γK`N(k,n−1) + (1− γK)`N(k,n) − `N(k,n+1) >
c
1− 2ρ
k = 1, . . . , K, n = 1, . . . , k, (2.37)
γK`Nn−1 + (1− γK)`Nn − `Nn+1 >
c
1− 2ρ
, n = 1, . . . , N − 1. (2.38)






























γK`N(k,n−1) + (1− γK)`N(k,n) − `N(k,n+1)
]



















ζ(K,n) := 2 + (K(1− ρ)− 1)
(











ζ ′1(K) := (1− ρK+1)(ĉ(1− ρ)(1− µ− ρ) + (1− µ)(1− 2ρ)2(2− ρ− ρK)),
ζ ′2(K) := (1− µ)ρ(1−K +Kρ− ρK)(ĉ(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)2(1− ρK)),
ζ ′3(K,n) :=
(
(1− 2ρ)2(1− ρK+1)− µ(1− ρ((4− ĉ)(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)2ρK))
(1− µ)ρ(ĉ(1− ρ) + (1− 2ρ)2(1− ρK))
)n+1
.
Because the incentive constraints hold strictly in the limit N → ∞, there exists N
sufficiently larges such that (2.36)–(2.38) hold.
Because the competent firm only shirks upon rating rN , the loss from the payoff
upper bound µ(1− 2ρ− c) occurs with probability















which strictly decreases in N and vanishes as N →∞. This completes the proof.
2.10.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
It is analogous to construct the fees such that each type of firm optimally accepts
and reports truthfully given the collection of equilibria.
Here, I focus on verifying the competent firm’s incentives to exert high effort
upon accepting and truthfully reporting. Let (rn′ , rn) denote a state, where rn′ is
the most recent past rating and rn is the current rating. Let V(n′,n) be the competent
type’s continuation payoff upon a state (rn′ , rn) in the induced game G(f
′
2, S2, C) upon
accepting and truthfully reporting given the collection of equilibria. The continuation
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payoffs solve the system of Bellman equations:
V(1,1) = (1− δ)(1− ρ− c) + δ[(1− ρ)V(1,1) + ρV(1,0)]
V(0,1) = (1− δ)(1− ρ− c) + δ[(1− ρ)V(1,1) + ρV(1,0)]
V(1,0) = (1− δ)(1− ρ− c) + δ[(1− ρ)V(0,1) + ρV(0,0)]
V(0,0) = (1− δ)(ρ+ µ̃1(1− 2ρ)− c) + δ[(1− ρ)V(0,1) + ρV(0,0)].















These two constraints hold simultaneously if and only if c ≤ c̄′2, where c̄′2 is defined
in (2.14) in the main text.
2.10.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
The proof is identical to that in Lemma 2.1 in the main text, except that here the
competent firm’s continuation profit after a history h upon a bad outcome satisfies
V (h
¯
y) ≥ ρ+ (1− 2ρ)
(
µρn
µρn + 1− µ
)







µρn + 1− µ
)
is the lowest equilibrium payment given efficiency.
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2.10.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that for every η > 0 and c < c̄, the certifier’s
optimal payoff is at least µ(1−2ρ−c)−η. The incentive constraint (2.24) necessarily
holds after some history ht in the induced game upon a competent report given some
collection of equilibria. Following the proof of Lemma 2.1,

























y] denotes the competent firm’s probability of high effort in
period s+t+1 (where the expectation is taken over continuation histories conditional
on ht
¯
y.). These two inequalities imply that a necessary condition for full-surplus
optimality is













As η → 0, it must be true that EPCC [σCs+t+1|ht
¯
y]→ 1. Let









By construction, (2.39) is violated for any c ∈ (c̄− x(η), c̄), yielding a contradiction.
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2.10.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Suppose not. Then it must be true that the competent type (virtually) consistently
exerts high effort. Because K = ∞, consumers’ beliefs that the firm is competent
converge to 1 as time grows conditional on the firm being competent, and the compe-
tent firm’s stage payoffs converge to 1− ρ− c given histories at which she is expected
to exert high effort. Thus, given any history h upon acceptance and truthful report-




V (h) = 1− ρ− c. (2.40)
Now, fix a history h′ upon acceptance and truthful reporting by the competent firm,
at which the competent firm exerts high effort. The incentive constraint for high effort
must hold (recall that ȳ denotes a good outcome and
¯
y denotes a bad outcome):
V (hȳ)− V (h′
¯
y) ≥ (1− δ)c
δ(1− 2ρ)
.
Using this inequality, the competent firm’s continuation payoff at history h′ must
satisfy
V (h′) ≤ (1− δ)(1− ρ− c) + δ((1− ρ)V (h′ȳ) + ρV (h′
¯
y))
≤ (1− δ)(1− ρ− c)− (1− δ)ρc
1− 2ρ
+ δV (h′ȳ).
Similarly, fix another history h′′ upon acceptance and truthful reporting by the com-
petent firm, at which the competent firm shirks. The incentive constraint for high
105
effort must be (weakly) violated:
V (h′′ȳ)− V (h′′
¯
y) ≤ (1− δ)c
δ(1− 2ρ)
.
Using this inequality, the competent firm’s continuation payoff at history h′′ must
satisfy
V (h′′) ≤ (1− δ)ρ+ δ(ρV (h′′ȳ) + (1− ρ)V (h′′
¯
y))





Thus, at any history h, the competent type’s continuation payoff upon acceptnace
and truthful reporting satisfies (and recall that 1 − ρ − c > c since high effort is
efficient)
V (h) ≤ (1− δ)(1− ρ− c)− (1− δ)ρc
1− 2ρ
+ δmax(V (hȳ), V (h
¯
y)).
Recursively applying this inequality to the continuation payoff, it holds that
V (h) ≤ 1− ρ− c− ρc
1− 2ρ
.
Taking the limit δ → 1 on both sides yield
lim
δ→1
V (h) ≤ 1− ρ− c− ρc
1− 2ρ
.
Because c > 0 and ρ < 1/2, (2.40) is violated, yielding a contradiction as desired.
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2.10.8 Proof of Proposition 2.7
The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2.1 in the main text. Here, I show
that the competent type consistently exerts high effort upon participating. Consider
the induced game G(f ′2, S
′
2, C). The firm’s continuation play from t ≥ 1 can be
represented by a two-state automaton, with the set of states given by {0, 1}. State
r collects the firm’s histories with the most recent rating being r. The competent
firm’s continuation profit in state r is
VC(r) = (1− δ)(pt(r)− c) + δ((1− ρ)αVC(1) + (1− (1− ρ)α)VC(0)),
where
pt(0) = ρ+ (1− 2ρ)ϕt(0) = ρ+
(1− 2ρ)µ(1− (1− ρ)α)
µ(1− (1− ρ)α) + (1− µ)(1− ρα)
, (2.41)
pt(1) = ρ+ (1− 2ρ)ϕt(1) = ρ+
(1− 2ρ)µ(1− ρ)α
µ(1− ρ)α + (1− µ)ρα
. (2.42)
A deviation to shirk yields
VC(r;
¯
e) := (1− δ)pt(r) + δ(ραV σC (1) + (1− ρα)V σC (0)).
The incentive constraint VC(r)− VC(r;
¯




µ(1− ρ) + (1− µ)ρ
− µ(1− α(1− ρ))




By definition of α, given in (2.22), the left hand side equals c. Therefore, the incentive
constraint holds. In period 0, each type of firm receives a payment
p0(0) = ρ+ µ(1− 2ρ) (2.44)
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Tournaments are commonly used as an incentive scheme to elicit costly effort from
economic agents.1 However, many tournament designs incentivize shirking behavior
from players, irrespective of any effort cost. Consider a simple example. Two players,
a and b, play against each other in stage 1 of a tournament. The winner plays against
c while the loser plays against d in stage 2. The winner of each match in stage 2
qualifies to be a final winner of the tournament. Suppose that when each player plays
to win, a always beats b and d, but loses to c. Further, d always beats b and c when
he plays to win, while b beats c. Each player prefers qualifying to a higher stage.
If they play to win throughout, then a is eliminated in stage 2 and d is the final
winner. However, a one-stage deviation by a to shirk and lose against b in stage 1
manipulates the qualification process and makes him the final winner at the expense
1. For example, they are used in sports events, labor promotions and innovation contests. Seminal
papers include Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983) and Rosen (1986). Konrad (2009)
provides a comprehensive survey.
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of d, who is now eliminated in stage 2. Importantly, effort cost is irrelevant in reaching
the decision to shirk. A famous real-world example is the 2012 London Olympics,
where eight badminton players were disqualified for deliberately losing matches to
meet preferred opponents in the next round.
The goal of the present paper is to characterize the set of tournaments immune
to such manipulation. This is of interest for three reasons. First, the manipulation
problem is in general detrimental to the profitability of organizing a tournament and
the reputation of its organizers, and may arise in any economic setting with multistage
competition. Second, it is often against a designer’s incentive to simply disqualify any
player who shirks in any tournament. In particular, it is often the stronger players
who profit by shirking, and they shirk to secure their participations in later stages.
The matches in later stages that feature stronger players tend to generate larger
revenues. Finally, the outcome of a tournament is supposed to reflect the relative
strengths of players. If the outcome is manipulated so that a player fails to qualify
in an earlier stage than some weaker player, the outcome becomes a noisy indicator
of the players’ strengths.
To set the stage, I develop a simple model that allows for an arbitrary design
of a tournament. This contrasts with existing work in the contest design literature,
which largely studies the prize spread or assignment of opponents to players given a
specific design. For example, see Rosen (1986), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), Groh,
Moldovanu, Sela, and Sunde (2012) and Fu and Lu (2013). In particular, I build upon
the traditional approach in the mathematics literature by defining a tournament as a
pair consisting of a set of players and a binary relation on the set which captures the
relative strength between any two players.2 A designer then chooses a design for any
given tournament, inducing a tournament game – a multistage game with observable
effort. Succinctly, in a tournament game, each stage is defined as a partition of the
2. For example, see Rubinstein (1980). Laslier (1997) provides an extensive survey.
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set of active players, while each element in the partition is a group of players, within
which the players play pairwise matches against all others. The result of each match
depends on the efforts exerted by the players and according to the match results,
a ranking of players is established for each group. Qualification of each player to
a higher stage depends on his rank in a group, subject to a quota. To illustrate, a
round-robin tournament game has one stage of active play, in which all players belong
to the same group. A single-elimination tournament game has a sequence of stage
partitions, each of which contains a number of groups of two, with the winner in each
group qualifying to the next stage. The 2014 FIFA World Cup had eight groups of
four teams from which two qualified in stage 1, and played as a single-elimination
tournament beginning from stage 2.
I characterize the set of incentive-compatible tournament games which are tour-
nament games with the following two properties, irrespective of players’ strengths.
First, to capture sequential rationality, full effort exertion is a subgame perfect equi-
librium, so that there exists at least one equilibrium with no manipulation. Second,
the outcome under each subgame perfect equilibrium must coincide with the outcome
prescribed by the full-effort social choice function, which maps the relative strengths
between players and a given design to an outcome under which the strongest play-
ers from a group qualify and among these qualifying players a stronger player ranks
higher. Put simply, this protects the outcome from manipulation even when a de-
viation away from full effort exertion to another equilibrium takes place. Plainly,
the main result we are going to prove is the following: Every incentive-compatible
tournament game allows only the top-ranked player from each group to qualify. In the
proof, we shall see that in tournament games with multiple qualifiers in some group,
some player can often profit by shirking to qualify with a lower rank. Indeed, in
every tournament game with multiple qualifiers in some group, there always exists an
equilibrium with an outcome different from the outcome prescribed by the full-effort
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social choice function.
This paper differs from related work by providing an analytical game-theoretic
foundation and allowing for an arbitrary design. For instance, Dagaev and Sonin
(2013) borrows tools from social choice theory to show that multiple qualifier sys-
tems, where players compete in several local tournaments to qualify to international
tournaments, are manipulable. On the other hand, Pauly (2014) uses a computer-
assisted proof to show that the designs of the 2012 Olympics Badminton and the 2014
FIFA World Cup give rise to manipulation.
3.2 Model
Let N be a finite set of players. A tournament is a pair (N,→), where → is a
complete, asymmetric and irreflexive binary relation on N , so that i → j if i is
(relatively) stronger than j. Given N , a designer fixes a design DN which induces
a tournament as a multistage game, referred to as a tournament game. A design
consists of four components:
1. a finite number of stages and groups in each stage, as well as the size and a
qualification quota of each group;
2. a partition P 1 of the set N , where each element G ∈ P 1 is a group in stage 1;
3. a sorting rule f t for each stage t > 1 that sorts players qualifying from stage
t− 1 into groups in stage t;
4. a tie-breaker tie, which is a strict linear order on N .
We label each group i in stage t by Gti and simply write G for an arbitrary
group unless there is a possibility of ambiguity. The order → on N is known to
the players and the designer only after the design is fixed. A player is active before
he is eliminated. In every stage t, each active player is sorted into some group G.
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Within G, every player i plays a match against each opponent j, where each costlessly
chooses an effort level from [0, 1] against his opponent. The player who exerts a
higher effort wins the match. When both exert the same effort, i wins if i → j. Let
wi(G) ≡ |{ι ∈ G : i wins against ι}| denote i’s number of wins in G. Define a ranking
of players G on G such that i G j, or i ranks higher than j in G, if wi(G) > wj(G),
or if wi(G) = wj(G) and i tie j. Also let wFEi (G) ≡ |{ι ∈ G : i → ι}| denote i’s
number of wins in G if all players exert the same effort (e.g., full effort, or effort 1).
The qG highest ranked players in G by G qualify from G to the next stage. Let
|G| ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ qG ≤ |G| − 1, so that at least one player is eliminated and at least
one qualifies from each group. In the next stage, active players are sorted into groups
by a sorting rule. A sorting rule f t partitions the set of active players in stage t
according to the label of the groups they qualify from in stage t−1 and their ranks in
the groups, with the partition denoted by P t such that each G ∈ P t is a group. The
game ends when players from stage T ≥ 1 qualify to stage T + 1, where no sorting of
players and no match take place.
Efforts are observed at the end of each stage and there is perfect recall. Let H t
be the set of histories in the beginning of stage t, which contains a typical element
h1 = ∅ or ht = (a1, . . . , at−1) for t ≥ 2, where ∅ denotes the null history and at is
the vector of efforts exerted by players in stage t. Let Ai(h
t) be player i’s set of
feasible effort choices in stage t when the history is ht. A pure strategy by i is a
sequence of maps (sti)
T
t=1, where each s
t
i : H
t → ∪ht∈HtAi(ht), so that sti(ht) ∈ Ai(ht)




t=1 to maximize his payoff defined by
ui(si, s−i) = t, given the strategy s−i by all players except i, where t is the highest
stage player i qualifies to. Of particular interest is the profile s∗, where players exert
full effort throughout (i.e., after all histories).
Let G′ denote the set of players qualifying from a group G. An outcome of a
tournament game is a collection of ordered sets (G′,G) for each group G in each
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stage t = 1, . . . , T . Define g(s) as the outcome yielded by some strategy profile s of the
game. A social choice function (henceforth, SCF) F maps (→, DN) into an outcome
F (→, DN). Let F FE be the full-effort SCF where F FE(→, DN) is the outcome such
that for each group G ∈ P t in each stage t = 1, . . . , T , for any two players i, j who
qualify (that is, i, j ∈ G′) and any player k who is eliminated from G,
1. min{wFEi (G), wFEj (G)} ≥ wFEk (G);
2. i G j if and only if wFEi (G) ≥ wFEj (G), where the tie breaker i tie j applies
when the inequality holds with equality.
A pair (F, s) of a SCF F and a strategy profile s is subgame perfect implementable
if s is a subgame perfect equilibrium (henceforth, SPE) and g(s′) = F (→, DN) for
any SPE s′. There is at least one SPE because a tournament game is a finite game
of perfect information.
A tournament game is incentive-compatible (henceforth, IC) if (F FE, s∗) is sub-
game perfect implementable for every order→ on N . Intuitively, the universal quan-
tification is desirable because the relative strengths are unknown before a design is
fixed. Examples 10 and 11 below show that the two requirements in the implemen-
tation of (F FE, s∗) are independent.
Remark 3.1. The fact that effort is costless and that players derive a unit marginal
payoff upon qualifying over each stage, albeit stylized, serves to emphasize that effort
cost and prize spread can be of little relevance to players’ effort choices when a
tournament is not IC. Moreover, pairwise matching stands in contrast to a more
general assumption where multiple players can possibly be matched simultaneously.
For our purpose, pairwise matching delivers an advantage by its clear application:
a player often chooses a specific opponent against whom he shirks, and pairwise
matching allows us to capture such action.
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Remark 3.2. The outcome prescribed by the full-effort SCF “imitates” the full effort
outcome in any equilibrium. Naturally, the outcome prescribed by a SCF contains
the elements that the designer cares about. According to the full-effort SCF, he is
concerned with the identity of and the observed rankings of the players who qualify
from each group in a stage. A less restrictive requirement would be that he cares about
their identities but not the observed rankings, or cares about the observed rankings
only if they affect subsequent partitions. The current definition of a full-effort SCF
has the advantage over the two less restrictive ones of revealing information about
the relative quality among the qualifying players in each group. We illustrate this by
the following simple example.
Example 6. Consider a tournament (N,→) where N = {a, b, c}, a → b, a → c
and b → c. The design DN is as follows. The first stage partition is P 1 = {A},
where A = N , with qA = 2. The two players qualifying from A are the final winners.
Clearly, players maximize their utilities by exerting full effort in each match such that
a A b A c, and s∗ is a SPE. Each player obtains the same utility in another SPE
equivalent to s∗ except that a deviates to lose against b such that b A a A c. If the
second equilibrium ranking is observed, one could potentially conclude that ranking
reveals that the relative quality of player b is the highest among the participating
players, when this is not the case. 
Furthermore, observe that the full-effort SCF imposes a restriction on the rankings
of qualifying players instead of all players in each group. The example below shows
that the latter requirement is so restrictive that even a simple round-robin tournament
is not subgame perfect implementable. Denote byG[r] the rth ranked player in a group
G.
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The design is one of round-robin: P 1 = {G} where G = {a, b, c, d, e, f}, and
G[1] is the final winner. Consider a strategy profile s equivalent to s∗ except that
a shirks against f in G. The tie-breaker satisfies a tie b tie c tie d tie e tie
f . It is straightforward to check that s is a SPE. In particular, under s we have
(wa, wb, wc, wd, we, wf ) = (4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3), where wi ≡ wi(G) for each player i. As a
result, f ranks strictly above all other players except a in G. Consider a social choice
function F FE∗ that requires that the ranking of all players, as opposed to only the
winner as does F FE, are equal to the ranking under full effort. Then F FE∗ designates
that i G f for every i ∈ N\{f}, so g(s) 6= F FE(→, DN). Intuitively, because a is
far stronger than his opponents in the group, he is indifferent between winning all
matches or winning all except losing to f . Losing to f , however, manipulates the
ranking. 
3.3 Incentive-Compatible Tournament Games
In this section, we formally state and prove the main theorem. Perhaps surprisingly,
as far as IC is concerned, all components in a design except the qualification quota
in each group are irrelevant.
Theorem 3.1. Fix a tournament (N,→). A tournament game induced by a design
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DN is IC if and only if the design designates that qG = 1 for every group G in any
stage t ≤ T .
Before proceeding to the proof, we study a few examples to illustrate the model
and to build intuition underlying the result. Example 8 illustrates a design which,
with multiple qualifiers allowed in some group, induces a tournament game where s∗
fails to be a SPE.







The design DN is as follows. The first stage partition is P
1 = {A,B}, where A =
{a, b, e} and B = {c, d, f}, with qA = qB = 2. Then P 2 = {C,D}, where C =
{A[1], B[2]} and D = {A[2], B[1]}, with qC = qD = 1. The players C[1] and D[1]
are the final winners. Consider the outcome under s∗. In stage 1, a A b A e and
c B d B f . In stage 2, C = {a, d} and D = {b, c}, with d C a and c D b. The
final winners are c and d. If a unilaterally deviates to shirk against b in stage 1, then
the ranking in A becomes b A a A e, so that C = {b, d} and D = {a, c} in stage 2.
Because a D c, a qualifies as a final winner and profits from the deviation. 
The key insight from the example is that we can always find a relation → on N
such that s∗ fails to be a SPE whenever a player can “choose” which group to qualify
to. Nonetheless, this should not be confused with the statement that one can always
find a relation→ on N such that s∗ fails to be a SPE whenever multiple qualifiers are
allowed in some group. In particular, Example 9 below shows that the latter claim is
false. Furthermore, building on the same setup, Example 10 shows that while s∗ is a
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SPE, there exists another SPE s inducing an outcome g(s) that does not agree with
any outcome prescribed by the full-effort SCF.
Example 9. Consider a tournament (N,→) where N = {a, b, c} and → is arbitrary.
The design DN is as follows. The first stage partition is P
1 = {A}, where A = {a, b, c}
and qA = 2. Then P
2 = {B}, where B = {A[1], A[2]} and qB = 1. B[1] is the final
winner. Given any history h2, exerting full effort in stage 2 by each active player
is clearly a Nash equilibrium. Consider the first stage. Depending on the precise
specification of→ on N , there are two possibilities in A when players exert full effort.
First, the first-ranked player has 2 wins, the second-ranked player has 1, while the
third-ranked player has 0. Second, each of them has 1 wins, and they are ranked
according to some given tie-breaker. Clearly, in either case, no player would be
strictly better off by deviating to shirk in any match. Therefore, s∗ is a SPE for any
→. 
Example 10. Consider the tournament game given above in Example 9, and suppose
that a→ b, b→ c and a→ c. The outcome implemented by the SCF F FE is such that
a A b A c; B = {a, b} and a B b, implying that a is the final winner. It is easy to
verify that s∗ is a SPE. Further, consider a strategy profile s equivalent to s∗ except
that a shirks against b in stage 1. Under s, b A a A c. Then B = {a, b}, a B b and
a is the final winner. Being the final winner, a has no profitable deviation. Neither
does b, because by shirking against a in either stage he cannot change his payoff,
and by shirking against c in stage 1, he can possibly be eliminated a stage earlier,
depending on the specified tie-breaker. Finally, it is clear that c has no profitable
deviation. Thus there exists a SPE s such that g(s) 6= F FE(→, DN). 
Conversely, Example 11 below illustrates a setting where g(s) = F FE(→, DN) for
any SPE s, but s∗ is not a SPE in the tournament game. Together with Example
10, this shows that the requirements of s∗ being a SPE and g(s) = F FE(→, DN) for
every SPE s are independent.
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Let the design DN designate that P
1 = {A,B,C} where A = {a, b, c} with qA = 2,
B = {d, e} with qB = 1 and C = {f, g} with qC = 1. Then P 2 = {D,E}, where D =
{A[1], B[1]} and E = {A[2], C[1]}. The players D[1] and E[1] are the final winners.
Finally, suppose that the tie-breaker follows c tie b tie a tie d tie e tie f tie g.
By construction of →, by exerting full effort in group E, A[2] ultimately becomes a
final winner, while A[1] is eliminated from group D in stage 2 as long as B[1] exerts
full effort. Moreover, in any SPE, both a and b never rank the lowest in A and are
eliminated, for a always qualifies by exerting full effort in every match in A, while b
always qualifies by exerting full effort against c. So in equilibrium, either a A b A c
or b A a A c. If the latter is true, then b must have 2 wins, a has 1, and c has
0, by construction of tie. Thus a must have shirked against b. But then b can be
strictly better off by shirking against a and qualify as A[2], contradicting subgame
perfection. So it must be true that a A b A c, and a has 2 wins, b has 1 and c has 0
by construction of tie. In particular, b must have shirked against a, for otherwise a
could shirk against him and profit by qualifying as A[2]. On the other hand, it should
be clear that the stronger player in each group B,C,D and E would exert full effort
in equilibrium. Thus g(s) = F FE(→, DN) in any SPE s. But s∗ is clearly not a SPE
in the induced tournament game, for a would profit by unilaterally deviating to shirk
against b in A to qualify as A[2]. 
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One key assumption underlying Theorem 3.1 is that the sorting rule in each stage
relies on the ranks of each qualified player instead of their numbers of wins in the
previous stage. Indeed, the latter measure provides an immediate medium for a
player to manipulate his standing and manipulating behavior may arise even when
the qualification quota is one in each group as shown Example 12 below.
Example 12. Fix some stage in an arbitrary tournament game. Suppose that if all
players exert full effort then player i ranks first with w wins in some group G the
current stage, qualifies to group A in the next stage and is eliminated. Suppose also
that no other player in G has more than w − 3 wins in the current stage, so i would
still qualify if he lost one match in G. Suppose that when i ranks first in G with
w− 1 wins he qualifies to group B in the next stage and then ranks first in B as long
as he exerts full effort. Then exerting full effort after all histories is not a SPE. 
We are now ready to prove the main result.
3.3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Fix a tournament (N,→) and a design DN with only one qualifier from each group in
each stage. Fix s∗ as the strategy profile. To show that it is a SPE, it suffices to show
that each player is best responding to others’ strategies from the beginning of each
stage given any history, since every stage begins with a proper subgame. Clearly,
this is true for any final winner. This is also true for a player eliminated in any
stage, because any deviation would see him remain eliminated since only one player
can qualify from each group and whenever qualified the player would be sorted in the
same group in the next stage upon deviation. Next, we show that g(s) = F FE(→, DN)
for any SPE s. Observe that, the outcome designated by F FE satisfies that i qualifies
from G if and only if i ∈ argmaxj∈GwFEj (G) and i tie k for any other maximizer
k. If g(s) 6= F FE(→, DN) for some SPE s, then there must exist a group G in some
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stage t after some history ht under s, and two players i, j ∈ G so that j G i but
i ∈ argmaxl∈GwFEl (G) and i tie k for any other maximizer k. Because qG = 1, i
is eliminated in stage t. But the fact that i is a maximizer implies that i must have
shirked in at least one match in G under s. If he deviates to exert full effort in those
matches, then he must rank first and qualify, contradicting that s is a SPE.
Conversely, it suffices to show for each design DN with qG > 1 in a group G in some
stage t that, for some order→ onN , either s∗ is not a SPE or that g(s) 6= F FE(→, DN)
for some SPE s. Fix a history ht, after which G = {1, 2, . . . , g}. Let the order → on
N designate that i → j if i < j for any two players i, j ∈ G. Thus i G j if i < j
under s∗, and both 1 and 2 qualify from G. Upon qualification, two possibilities arise,
depending on the sorting rule f t+1. The first possibility entails that 1, 2 ∈ A for some
group A in stage t + 1. Let s∗ be a SPE, for otherwise the claim is proved in this
case. Consider a one-stage deviation s from s∗ in stage t where 1 shirks against 2 in
G. The rankings of all groups in P t are unchanged, except that the ranks of 1 and 2
switch in G so that g(s) 6= F FE(→, DN). We argue that s is a SPE: first, the stage
partitions (P t)Tt=1 are the same under s and s
∗, which implies that players face the
same opponents in each stage under both profiles; second, s∗ is a SPE. Therefore IC
fails. It remains to consider the second possibility, where 1 and 2 are sorted into two
separate groups, say B and C respectively, in stage t + 1. Further let the order →
on N designate that, i → 1 for each i ∈ B\{1} and 1 → j for each j ∈ C. Clearly,
1 ranks the lowest in B and is eliminated in stage t + 1. However, s∗ is not a SPE
because a one-stage deviation by 1 to shirk against 2 in G would allow 1 to qualify




The result has the flavor of an impossibility result by implying that many tournament
games in practice are not IC. Nonetheless, in practice, regulations that allow only one
qualifier from each group may not be desirable. The appeal of IC may therefore be
put into question. Imagine an unknown tennis player being drawn against Roger
Federer in the same group in the first stage of a single-elimination tournament. The
tournament game is IC, but is perhaps too harsh on the athletes and their fans. Of
course, there are many factors other than IC, for instance time constraint and the
number of matches, that a designer needs to take into account when designing a tour-
nament. To be clear, the aim of the present paper is not to provide a general selection
criterion of tournament designs. Instead it seeks to provide a baseline framework for
future work. For instance, the current solution concept is binary: a tournament game
is either IC or not. Devising a method to quantify IC would allow for the study of
trade-offs between IC and other potentially desirable factors.
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